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Homeowners have carefully vetted potential applicants to lease their
home while homeowners are in Europe for a year. As the selected lessee is
well aware, he would not have been chosen unless he agreed not to sublet
the premises. The lease agreement conspicuously states the sublease prohi-
bition. Lessee, nevertheless, profitably sublets the property, but the breach
is not discovered by homeowners until after the lease has expired.
Contractor agrees to use specified materials in building a home. He in-
stead uses cheaper materials, resulting in significant savings in his building
costs. The value of the home, however, is not affected by the substitution.
The cost to replace the substituted materials with those specified by the
contract will greatly exceed the value of the completed home.
As part of his contract of employment, an employee agrees never to di-
vulge employer's methods of doing business or matters pertaining to em-
ployer's personal affairs. None of employer's methods are unusual and
none constitute trade secrets, but employer, a well-known celebrity, highly
values his privacy. After leaving his employment, employee publishes a
very profitable book about employer's business methods and personal
habits.
Despite the disparate facts in the above situations, they all have one thing
in common: in none of them is an action for breach of contract likely to
result in an award of damages that will adequately protect the contract right
that has been violated. In each case, the promisee will probably be unable
to prove actual damages with reasonable certainty because contract law
typically deems intrinsic and other non-pecuniary losses to be too specula-
tive and conjectural to support damage awards. Contract provisions that
seek to protect these kinds of rights, regardless of their importance to the
promisee, are thereby rendered practically meaningless. The denial of dam-
ages for their violation becomes particularly disturbing where the default-
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ing promisor is allowed not only to breach with impunity, but also to
garner significant profits from the breach. Contract law's historical inabil-
ity to recognize and evaluate non-pecuniary contract rights therefore repre-
sents a significant gap in its panorama of applicable damage remedies.
For over a half-century, leading scholars have maintained that contract
law should fill this gap by providing promisees some type of a disgorge-
ment restitution remedy that would allow a recovery of all or part of the
profit that the breaching party has earned from the breach. In support of
their arguments, they all reference the same handful of cases involving spe-
cifically identifiable fact patterns for which the courts have used various
theories to award the promisee profits attributable to the breach. These the-
ories, however, typically do not focus on, and the courts invoking them
make no mention of, either restitution or disgorgement. Avowed disgorge-
ment for breach cases are few and far between.
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 39 pro-
poses a disgorgement remedy for breach of contract that is expressly in-
tended to apply not only in the aforementioned situations involving non-
pecuniary contract rights, but also in any other situation where the prom-
isor deliberately (and profitably) breaches but leaves the promisee with no
adequate damage remedy. This article argues that the remedy is woefully
designed for its task because it is framed by restitution principles, rather
than those of contract law. Its application is limited exclusively to deliber-
ate breaches, and, therefore, it contravenes the bulk of the cases noted
above that have been identified by scholars as precedent for a disgorgement
remedy for breach. Section 39, however, disingenuously uses these cases as
precedent for its rule, enshrines them as illustrations of its application, but
then reverses the results in most of them. The proposed remedy, therefore,
will do little to close the aforementioned gap in contract law's current rem-
edy scheme. Further, when the remedy does apply, it is purely punitive be-
cause it would take from the breaching party all of the identifiable profits,
regardless of whether they are directly attributable to the breach, and even
though they clearly exceed the value to the promisee of the contract right
that has been infringed. The provision thereby undermines two benchmark
contract law principles-that innocence or willfulness of the breaching
party is generally irrelevant to a promisee's recovery for breach and that
damages for breach may not exceed the value of the promisee's lost
expectancy.
This article demonstrates that virtually all of the cases used by the new
Restatement to support its new disgorgement remedy can be better under-
stood and justified as compensatory awards that make use of all or part of
the breaching promisor's profits to make the plaintiff promisee whole for
non-pecuniary losses-as compensation-based rather than restitution-
based judgments. Since the profits earned by the breaching parties establish
that the otherwise non-pecuniary contract right of the promisees did indeed
have a monetary value, the requirement of proving damages with reasona-
ble certainly-which cannot be accomplished for purely non-pecuniary
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contract rights-should then no longer act to bar recovery of compensatory
damages. Precedent for taking profits from the promisor as a measurement
of damages caused by the breach abounds in this country from decades of
cases that have estimated reasonable royalties for patent infringements and
also from Great Britain in all sorts of cases, where so-called "Wrotham
Park" damages are used to measure the value of non-pecuniary contract
rights. This article, however, rejects the patent law and British approaches
of measuring compensation on the basis of the amount the parties would
have negotiated to allow the promisor to buy out of the contract (an ex ante
settlement price) in favor of basing compensatory damages on a fact-inten-
sive inquiry that would focus on the subjective value to the promisee of the
contract right that has been infringed.
Part II below briefly examines the historical structure of contract reme-
dies and affirms that neither the common law of contract nor the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts provides a disgorgement remedy for breach.
Part III summarizes both the types of cases that have, using various theo-
ries, rendered judgments awarding profits from breach and the scholarly
writings that have called for a disgorgement remedy (of some sort) for
breach of contract. Part IV examines the requirements in § 39 that define
the scope of the proposed remedy, requirements that are as familiar to the
law of restitution as they are foreign to the law of contract. Part V examines
the § 39 illustrations and the court decisions upon which they are based
and demonstrates that most of these decisions do not support § 39's criteria
for a disgorgement remedy. The article groups these cases into categories
based on theories that support a compensation-based recovery rather than
the restitution-based recovery proffered by § 39. It suggests that this com-
pensatory approach operates well within contract law's current rule struc-
ture and is thus preferable to the iconoclastic approach proposed by § 39.
Part VI then suggests how a compensation-based remedy should be struc-
tured so as to comply with contract law's primary remedy goal of allowing
a recovery that will best approximate the monetary position the promisee
would have occupied had the contract been performed, without penalizing
the breaching party or otherwise allowing for windfall damages.
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I. PREFACE
"Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest
than in the law of contract.. .. The duty to keep a contract at common law
means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it - and
nothing else .... But such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the
nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the
law as they can."
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'
T is remarkable that such a fundamentally jaundiced and counterin-
tuitive outlook as this "Holmesian paradox"' had, and continues to
have, so dramatic an effect on the basic structure of contract reme-
dies.2 Holmes's view came to represent the fundamental core of compen-
sation theory for breach of contract, a theory that both establishes the
primary goal for contract remedies and limits them entirely to that pur-
pose.3 It demands that contract remedies focus exclusively on the prom-
isee's loss to the exclusion of the promisor's gain, even if the gain is
directly attributable to the breach.4 In contrast with most other legal sys-
tems, it rejects both specific performance and injunction as primary reme-
dies for breach. 5 It substitutes instead the remedy of damages-a remedy
intended to give the promisee the monetary equivalent of the promisor's
performance. 6 All of these principles found their way into both the origi-
t The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
1. This is the label used by the new Restatement of Restitution for Holmes's concept
of the relationship between contract law and morality. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTI-
TUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. a (2012). It is more commonly called Holmes's
"bad man" theory of law. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 459, 461 (1897) (discussing what legal duty means to a "bad man").
2. See also Holmes, supra note 1, at 462 ("The duty to keep a contract at common law
means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it - and nothing else.");
Oliver Wendell Holmes, THE COMMON LAW 301 (1881) ("The only universal consequence
of a legally binding promise is that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the prom-
ised event does not come to pass.").
3. Holmes's theory, however, assumed that damages would compensate the prom-
isee: "If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit a
contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to
pass, and that is all the difference." Holmes, supra note 1, at 462.






nal Restatement of Contracts and its successor, documents that were re-
spectively penned primarily by two of this country's premier authorities,
Samuel Williston and Allan Farnsworth, whose philosophical views on
much of contract law differed dramatically from each other.7
In time, some economists saw these principles as providing fertile
ground for a truly unrelated idea, the now rather infamous theory of "ef-
ficient breach"-a self-indulgent proclamation that is noxious to even
neoclassical contract law. 8 The theory is that a promisor should not only
be allowed the option to breach and pay damages but, in fact, be en-
couraged to do so when she perceives it to be advantageous. 9 The hereti-
cal supposition of an efficient breach is that the compensated promisee
will be indifferent to the breach, the breaching promisor will be most
pleased with herself, and the rest of us will somehow happily benefit (but
quite indirectly) by having the performance of the breached contract
wind up with someone who, by paying more for it, has obviously demon-
strated that she values the performance more than does the promisee.1°
In his well-known illustration of this simple paradigm, Judge Richard Pos-
ner, perhaps its foremost proponent, ends with the conclusion that the
breach is efficient because, assuming the promisee will be compensated
with expectancy damages, society as a whole benefits when a contract
performance moves "from a lower valued to a higher valued use.""
7. See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS (1981).
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. h
(2011).
9. Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Homes on Efficient Breach and Tor-
tious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1091 (2000).
10. In 1972, Richard A. Posner published Economic Analysis of Law, an extraordinary
book that, to varying degrees, shaped the way a generation of law teachers approached and
analyzed legal issues. Early in the book Posner stated his theory of efficient breach as
follows:
[I]n some cases a party [to a contract] would be tempted to breach the con-
tract simply because his profit from breach would exceed his expected profit
from completion of the contract. If his profit from breach would also exceed
the expected profit to the other party from completion of the contract, and if
damages are limited to loss of expected profit, there will be an incentive to
commit a breach. There should be.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 57 (1972) (emphasis added).
In his brilliant review of the book, Arthur Allen Leff professed, in his inimitable way, deep
concern with addressing legal problems primarily from an economic perspective, and urged
extreme caution because "lives can be lashed to pieces as a new distributional curve flails
about, desperately seeking a new equilibrium." Arthur A. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law:
Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 469 (1974). Leff, however, ulti-
mately found solace with the following:
Thus, though one can graph (non-interpersonally comparable) marginal utili-
ties for money which are the very picture of geometric nymphomania, we still
preserve our right to say to those whose personalities generate such curves,
"You swine," or "When did you first notice this anal compulsion overwhelm-
ing you?" or even "Beware the masses." And indeed "the law," even "the
common law," has on impulses like those often said, even against efficiency -
"Sorry buddy, you lose."
Id. at 481 (emphasis omitted); see also supra note 9.
11. Posner's illustration was as follows:
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This article is about a "disgorgement" restitution remedy for contract
law proposed by § 39 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment.12 The proposed remedy fundamentally clashes with the the-
ory of efficient breach because, in most cases, the disgorgement would
take away all of the breaching promisor's profit attributable to the
breach. 13 There is little likelihood, however, that this tension will concern
courts in their examination of the new remedy. In the forty-plus years
since it first slithered into view, the efficient breach paradigm has been
almost exclusively a creature of the academic literature and the law
school classroom.14 Lawyers and judges on the firing line have mostly
either rejected the theory or ignored it.15 It has had little demonstrable
impact on real world legal arguments and judicial decisions because the
idea is based on so many unrealistic and unprovable assumptions that run
counter to the workaday world, to life experience, and to the natural intu-
ition of fair-minded people.' 6 It is not that the theory presents inherent
complexities that are difficult for busy lawyers and judges to grapple
with.17 Actually, the idea is rather simplistic. But, it requires that the be-
I sign a contract to deliver 100,000 custom-ground widgets at $.10 apiece to
A, for use in his boiler factory. After I have delivered 10,000, B comes to me,
explains that he desperately needs [widgets immediately], and offers me $.15
apiece for 25,000 widgets. I sell him the widgets and as a result do not com-
plete timely delivery to A, who sustains $1000 in damages from my breach.
Having obtained an additional profit of $1250 on the sale to B, I am better
off even after reimbursing A for his loss. Society is also better off. Since B
was willing to pay me $.15 per widget, it must mean that each widget was
worth at least $.15 to him. But it was worth only $.14 to A - $.10, what he
paid, plus $.04 ($1000 divided by 25,000), his expected profit. Thus the breach
resulted in a transfer of the 25,000 widgets from a lower valued to a higher
valued use.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 57 (1972).
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (2011)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. The text of § 39 is set out infra at note 117.
13. The commentary for the provision candidly acknowledges that "[t]he rationale of
the disgorgement liability in restitution, in a contractual context or any other, is inherently
at odds with the idea of efficient-breach in its usual connotation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. h (2011). The tension here is not
caused by the availability of the remedy itself, because the efficient breach theory assumes
compensation can be made to the promisee. Id. The disgorgement remedy would apply
only when other contract remedies do not protect the promisee's contractual entitlement.
Id. The conflict is caused by the fact that in most cases disgorgement would be of the full
profit earned from breach even when the measurement ostensibly overcompensates the
promisee. Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the "Restitution Interest," and the Re-
statement of Contracts, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2021, 2051 (2001). As explained below, this article
takes the position that § 39 goes too far in this regard and that the proper measurement for
disgorgement should be limited by the amount reasonably necessary to compensate the
promisee. Coincidentally, this view would bring § 39 more in line with efficient-breach
theory. See id. at 2052-53.
14. Andrew Kull, the Reporter for Restatement (Third), correctly labels efficient
breach a "hypothetical" and an "academic artifact" that is "as familiar in the classroom as
it is difficult to find in real life." Kull, supra note 13, at 2051.
15. Craig S. Warhol, Resolving the Paradox Between Legal Theory and Legal Fact: The
Judicial Rejection of Efficient Breach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 321, 334-35, 337-39, 340
(1998).
16. See Warhol, supra note 15, at 352-53
17. Id. at 321-22.
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liever accept several inherently implausible assumptions, including (at a
minimum) that the breaching promisor: (1) knows before he breaches
that the promisee does not value performance more than the monetary
amount that the law will allow in substitution; (2) will not make self-serv-
ing rationalizations in that regard; and (3) will voluntarily pay a compen-
satory amount so the promisee will not incur psychological and social
costs, as well as non-refundable expenses that would be incurred to co-
erce the payment. 18 For any one of these to prove true would be seren-
dipitous; for all of them to do so would be incredible, unless the promisor
actually negotiates an arm's-length buyout of the contract.' 9 The theory,
however, then caves in on itself because it does not encourage a buyout
to protect the contractual entitlement of the promisee, but rather a
breach in the interest of some "greater good."'20
II. THE ABSENCE OF A DISGORGEMENT REMEDY IN THE
SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
Several decades ago, scholars began to separate restitution remedies
arising from a contract setting into two distinct categories: (1) those that
are intended merely to return the plaintiff to the status quo (the position
occupied at the time of the contract); and (2) those that are intended to
deprive the defendant of an unjust enrichment.2 ' The former function as
restoration restitution because they return to the plaintiff the value of the
18. Id. at 343.
19. Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV.
947, 961 (1982).
20. Unsurprisingly, most dispassionate contracts scholars have rejected the theory out
of hand. See Macneil, supra note 19, at 960 (criticizing the theory of efficient breach for its
failure to account for transaction costs, such as those of litigation and settlement, as well as
relational costs such as injury to reputation, and concluding that, since these types of costs
will not be recoverable as damages payable by the breaching promisor "the likelihood of
his making inefficient decisions is increased"); Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the Economic
Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443,
1448-64, 1478 (1980) (demonstrating that the theory encourages inefficient opportunistic
breaches because it does not account for transactions costs, including those of litigation
and settlement); Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1989); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 16, intro, note (1981) ("The
analysis of breach of contract in purely economic terms assumes an ability to measure
value with certainty that is not often possible in the judicial process. The analysis also
ignores the 'transaction costs' inherent in the bargaining process and in the resolution of
disputes, a defect that is especially significant where the amount in controversy is small.");
cf Delong, The Efficiency of a Disgorgement as a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 22 IND.
L. REV. 737, 742-45 (1989) (suggesting that a general disgorgement remedy for breach of
contract will often operate inefficiently because of contract-renegotiation costs that would
be necessary for the promisor to buy out of the contract with the promisee).
21. Eric G. Anderson, The Restoration Interest and Damages for Breach of Contract,
53 MD. L. REv. 1, 33 (1994). Joseph Perillo was perhaps the first to emphasize that restitu-
tion for breach of contract, which he labeled "restitution in a contractual context," was
designed entirely to protect the plaintiff's restoration interest. Joseph M. Perillo, Restitu-
tion in a Contractual Context, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1208, 1217-18 (1973). Perillo later
demonstrated that Restatement (Second) did not broaden this approach. Joseph Perillo,
Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 34, 38-39 (1981).
Perillo's "restitution in a contractual context" is more commonly referred to as restitution
to protect the plaintiff's "restoration interest," a label apparently coined by Eric Andersen.
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performance she had given the defendant prior to his breach. 22 The latter
perform a disgorgement function because they are unconcerned with the
plaintiff's loss but are intended instead to nullify the defendant's unjust
enrichment, which is the essential purpose of the law of restitution.2 3 As a
general proposition, contract law embraces restoration, but ignores
disgorgement. 24
Tort law has for centuries recognized a disgorgement remedy for con-
version25 and, to a lesser extent, for trespass. 26 Where the wrongdoer has
misappropriated the plaintiff's property and has resold it or used it to
save costs, the plaintiff may, as the saying goes, "waive the tort and sue in
assumpsit. ' '2 7 Assumpsit, in this context, is the restitution remedy of
quasi-contract or quantum meruit.28 The intent is to disgorge the defen-
dant's unjust enrichment, and the remedy is particularly advantageous to
Eric G. Andersen, The Restoration Interest and Damages for Breach of Contract, 53 MD. L.
REV. 1, 33-34, 36 (1994).
22. Anderson, supra note 21, at 33.
23. As did its predecessor; Restatement (Third) § 1 succinctly provides: "A person who
is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in restitution."
24. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 559-61 (2006).
25. The waiver of tort theory was first recognized for the tort of conversion in Lamine
v. Dorrell, 92 Eng. Rep. 303 (1705). It has since been applied in countless conversion cases
and in a burgeoning number of trespass cases. The theory has been extended occasionally
to fraud cases where the plaintiff has no provable actual damages. These three categories
of torts largely cover the field. See Ward v. Taggart, 336 P.2d 534 (Cal. 1959) (waiver of tort
of fraud); Harper v. Adametz, 113 A.2d 136 (Conn. 1955) (waiver of tort of fraud); cf. Hart
v. E.P. Dutton & Co., 197 Misc. 274, 93 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1949) (refusing to extend the waiver
theory to defamation action). As succinctly put by Dan Dobbs, "[t]he waiver of tort idea
has not been extended very far." D. DOBBS, The Law of Remedies, § 4.2(3), 585 (2d ed.
1993).
26. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 129 (1937). But see Raven Red Ash
Co. v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231, 238-39 (Va. 1986). The traditional rule is that the tort-waiver
theory does not extend to trespass or other invasion of an interest in realty because restitu-
tion was thought to be an inappropriate remedy for dealing with issues of title. The original
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 129(2) (1937) succinctly provided: "[a] person who has
trespassed upon the land of another is not thereby under a duty of restitution to the other
for the value of its use .... However, a growing number of courts have applied the theory
to trespass cases. See, e.g., Raven, 39 S.E.2d 231 (Va. 1946) (finding the old rule illogical). A
leading case disgorging profits resulting from trespass under the tort waiver theory is Ed-
wards v. Lee's Adm'r, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936). But see Triple Elkhorn Mining Co. v.
Anderson, 646 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Ky. 1983) (in which the Kentucky court labeled its deci-
sion in the Edwards case "sui generis and peculiar on its facts" and suggested that the tort
waiver rule for trespass cases should not apply where, unlike in Edwards, a fair estimate of
the plaintiff's damages could be made); see also D. DOBBS, supra note 25, § 5.8(2), 790-92
(finding the tort waiver for trespass cases "peculiar" and expressing favor for the tradi-
tional rule barring restitution). Restatement (Third) § 40, however, rejects the traditional
rule. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 40 cmt. c,
illus. 4i & 5 cmt. f, illus. 13, 15 (each of which are based upon Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r and
allow disgorgement of all profits that result directly from the trespass).
27. Waiving the tort is a fiction because the tortious wrong's existence is what justifies
the plaintiffs recovery. Without the tort, there could be no recovery. See W. Nat. Bank of
Casper v. Harrison, 577 P.2d 635, 641 (Wyo. 1978) (noting that in these cases "conversion
never really loses its identity as a tort because if it did, there would be no real basis for the
eventual relief afforded").
28. The action recognized in Lamine v. Dorrell, 92 Eng. Rep. 303 (1705), was in as-
sumpsit for money had and received, a version of a count in quantum meruit.
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the plaintiff where the defendant's profit from using the property exceeds
the plaintiff's loss. 29
In stark contrast, our courts have repeatedly rejected the waiver con-
cept for actions based on breach of contract. 30 The oft-stated rule is that,
where a legally enforceable contract exists between the parties litigant, an
action in restitution may not be had to disgorge the defendant's gains,
even those directly attributable to the breach.31 The plaintiff, instead, is
restricted to damages for breach, the notion being that disgorging the de-
fendant's gains in excess of the plaintiff's loss would redistribute the risks
the contract has allocated and, in effect, rewrite the agreement. 32 Al-
though most courts have enforced this prohibition absolutely, many
others have limited its application to situations where the plaintiff does
have an adequate damage remedy for breach. 33
The new Restatement of Restitution affirms the quasi-contract ban,34
but cautions that the prohibition applies "only so long as the reference to
contract is appropriately restricted to valid and enforceable obliga-
tions. '35 Section 39 would provide a "limited exception" to this restric-
tion with a disgorgement remedy for "cases of profitable and
opportunistic breach. '36 A significant impediment to the remedy's ac-
ceptance undoubtedly will be its candid disavowal of any intent to limit
29. See id.
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 ch. 1, report-
ers note (2011).
31. See id. The Reporter's Note to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 refers to Cty. Comm'r
of Caroline Cty. v. J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc., 747 A.2d 600 (Md. 2000), which collects
cases on both sides from both state and federal courts. See Reporter's Note c.
32. Cty. Commr's of Caroline Cty., 747 A.2d 600, 607 (Md. 2000) ("The general rule is
that no quasi-contractual claim can arise when a contract exists between the parties con-
cerning the same subject matter on which the quasi-contractual claim rests. (Citations
omitted.) The reason for this rule is not difficult to discern. When parties enter into a
contract they assume certain risks with an expectation of a return. Sometimes, their expec-
tations are not realized, but they discover that under the contract they have assumed the
risk of having those expectations defeated. As a result, they have no remedy under the
contract for restoring their expectations. In desperation, they turn to quasi-contract for
recovery. This the law will not allow.") (quoting Mass Transit Admin. v. Granite Constr.
Co., 471 A.2d 1121, 1126 (Md. 1984) (in turn quoting Indus. Lift Truck Serv. Corp. v.
Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 432 N.E.2d 999, 1002 (Ill. App. 3d 1982); see also Indus. Lift Truck
Serv. Corp., 432 N.E.2d at 1002 (noting that parties entering into a contract "assume cer-
tain risks with the expectation of a [beneficial] return"; however, when such expectations
are not realized, they may not "turn to quasi-contract theory for recovery").
33. See Gadsby v. Norwalk Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324, 1333 (7th Cir. 1995)
("[R]estitution is unavailable where an express contract governs the parties' relationship
and where there is an adequate remedy at law.").
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 (2) (2011).
("A valid contract defines the obligations of the parties as to matters within its scope,
displacing to that extent any inquiry into unjust enrichment.").
35. Id. at reporter's note c. The meaning here is that the limitation does not apply to
failed contracts, those that are unenforceable under a statute of frauds or because of mu-
tual mistake, fraud, impossibility, or other invalidating cause. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 375-377 (1981). Contract law does allow a quasi-contract ac-
tion in such situations. See id.
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 cmt. c.
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the recovery to the harm caused to the plaintiff.37 This article seeks to
demonstrate that the remedy would garner greater acceptance if it had
been formulated as one intended to compensate the plaintiff for an other-
wise unprovable loss rather than as some new-fangled remedy intended
to disgorge the defendant's gains from breach-as compensatory in na-
ture, but with disgorgement wholly or partially being only an unintended
concomitant. 38
The proposed remedy is not "new" because of a dearth of caselaw to
support at least some version of it, but because the common law of con-
tract, particularly as reflected by Restatement (Second) of Contracts, con-
tains nothing that resembles a disgorgement remedy for breach. 39
Andrew Kull affirmed this vital point with a painstaking analysis of both
the original and current Restatements.40 There is no need to summarize
his analysis here, only to highlight his conclusions. The Restatement pro-
vides that contract remedies are intended to protect three distinct inter-
ests of the promisee: the "expectation interest," the "reliance interest,"
and the "restitution interest. '41 These interests are not inherently distinct,
but will often overlap. 42 Therefore, they are listed by the Restatement in
a descending order of their importance in terms of the measure of recov-
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Ch. 16, topics intro, note (1981). As
discussed in Part I, Holmesian theory regarding the consequence of breach is the founda-
tion of the remedy scheme formulated in Restatement (Second) of Contracts: "The tradi-
tional goal of the law of contract remedies has not been compulsion of the promisor to
perform his promise but compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from the
breach." Id. Here, the reporter for the Restatement, Allan Farnsworth, echoed his classic
article on contract remedies, in which he said that the fundamental goal of contract reme-
dies "is not directed at compulsion of promisors to prevent breach; rather, it is aimed at
relief to promisees to redress breach." Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of
Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1970) (emphasis omitted).
38. See Lamine v. Dorrell, 92 Eng. Rep. 303 (1705).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981)
40. Kull, supra note 13, at 2029-44. Kull emphasized that the first Restatement of Con-
tracts was published five years before the original Restatement of Restitution. Id. at 2032.
When the second Restatement of Contracts came along decades later, it understandably
defined the promisee's restitution interest to account for the disgorgement principle em-
bodied in the Restatement of Restitution. Id. at 2039. The restitution interest was stated as
the promisee's interest in having the "benefit" earned from breach restored to her. Id. at
2040. This apparent change in focus, however, was pure semantics. Id. The second Restate-
ment's restitution remedies do not extend to disgorgement any more than did the original
Restatement's. Id. at 2039. They are designed only to return the promisee to the status
quo-to protect the restoration interest. Id. at 2041.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981) provides:
§ 344. Purposes of Remedies
Judicial remedies under the rules stated in this Restatement serve to protect
one or more of the following interests of a promisee:
(a) his "expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of
his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had
the contract been performed,
(b) his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for
loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position
as he would have been in had the contract not been made, or
(c) his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored to him
any benefit that he has conferred on the other party."
42. See id. at § 344 cmt. a.
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ery they will allow.43 Thus, the reliance interest is a subset of the expecta-
tion interest, and the restitution interest is a subset of the reliance
interest.44 This relationship is true for the reliance interest because of the
longstanding rule, meticulously followed by the courts, that a plaintiff's
recovery of reliance "damages" 45 may not exceed expectancy damages. 46
The same is generally true for the promisee's restitution interest, but
with a major exception. 47 The only restitution remedy for breach recog-
nized by the Restatement is the promisee's right in response to a material
breach to treat the contract as rescinded and to recover in restitution.48
The measure of recovery is the reasonable value of the promisee's per-
formance received by the promisor prior to breach, a measure that is in-
tended to restore the promisee to his pre-contract position rather than to
disgorge the promisor's gains. 49 In this narrow sense of returning the
promisee to the status quo ante, the restitution interest is conceptually a
subset of the reliance interest.50 It is this limited concept of the restitution
interest that Lon Fuller identified in his foundational article5 1 and, as Kull
carefully demonstrated, is the concept incorporated into the remedy
scheme of Restatement (Second) of Contracts.52
Actually, in most cases, the restitution interest will be identical to the
reliance interest. The two will deviate only where the promisee has in-
curred reliance expenses that are not a part of the performance received
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 38, re-
porter's note. The phrase "reliance damages" is something of a misnomer because these
"damages" are, by definition, not caused by the breach. Instead, they are the promisee's
expenses of performance that would have been incurred regardless of the breach. See id.
§ 38 (2)(a). The phrase is, however, common usage and has always been found unobjec-
tionable. See id. § 38 cmt. a.
46. This principle is affirmed by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349
(1981), which deducts from a reliance-based recovery "any loss that the party in breach can
prove with reasonable certainty the injured party would have suffered had the contract
been performed." A leading case on point is L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178
F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1949).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 (1981).
48. Id.
49. For example, in applying this principle in the widely cited case, United States v.
Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d 638, 641-43 (4th Cir. 1973), the trial court had measured the
plaintiff's restitution recovery by the contract rate for its performance prior to the breach.
The Fourth Circuit found this measurement improper and remanded for a determination
measured by the reasonable value of the plaintiffs performance. Id.; see also Acme Process
Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 530 rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 138 (1966)
("It is clear, however, that restitution is permitted as an alternative remedy for breach of
contract in an effort to restore the innocent party to its pre-contract status quo, and not to
prevent the unjust enrichment of the breaching party.") (emphasis added).
50. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,
46 YALE L.J. 52, 73 (1936).
51. Id.
52. Kull, supra note 13, at 2038-44. Indeed, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 370
leads off the document's restitution provisions with the general observation that "[a] party
is entitled to restitution under the rules stated in this Restatement only to the extent that
he has conferred a benefit on the other party by way of part performance or reliance."
(emphasis added). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 370 (1981).
2015]
SMU LAW REVIEW
by the breacher. It is here that the restoration interest slips its leash as a
subset of the reliance interest, because, under the prevailing contract rule,
the amount of a recovery based on restitution may greatly exceed that of
both the expectancy and the reliance interests.53 However, the only cate-
gory of cases in which this will occur is that of the "losing contract,"
where the breach actually saves the promisee from losses that would have
been incurred had his performance not been excused by the breach. 54
There is an overlapping category of cases where the promisee is al-
lowed to recover restitution of monetary payments made to the breacher
even though the recovery exceeds the promisee's provable lost expecta-
tion.55 Obviously these too are "losing contracts" for the promisee, 56 but
the difference here is that the recovery precisely equals her reliance dam-
ages. 57 The payment refund cases, though labeled as restitution recov-
eries, do represent a jarring exception to the otherwise universal rule that
reliance damages may not exceed the lost expectation.58 These cases also
conflict with Lon Fuller's hierarchy of contract remedial interests-in
particular Fuller's assertion that the restitution interest, by definition,
could never exceed the reliance interest.59 This conflict, however, is
anomalous and is not intended to extend the Restatement's limited con-
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. d (1981) ("Occasionally a
party chooses the restitution interest even though the contract is enforceable because it
will give a larger recovery than will enforcement based on either the expectation or reli-
ance interest. These rare instances are dealt with in § 373."). "The right of the injured party
under a losing contract to a greater amount in restitution than he could have recovered in
damages has engendered much controversy. The rules stated in this Section give him that
right." Id. § 373 cmt. d.
54. The widely cited and perhaps most egregious reported decision on point is Boomer
v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570 (Cal. 1933), in which the plaintiff, a building subcontractor, recovered
$250,000 as the value of his performance when the full remaining unpaid contract price
(the maximum lost expectation) was only $20,000. The cases in this category have long
been criticized by courts and commentators. See generally E.ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CON-
TRACTS § 12.20 (3d ed. 2004); Kull, supra note 13, at 2041 n.49.
55. The leading case is Bush v. Canfield, 2 Conn. 485, 487 (Conn. 1818) (plaintiff al-
lowed restitution of $5,000 advance payment for flour even though lost expectation dam-
ages were only $2,000, measured by the difference between the applicable market price of
$11,000 and the unpaid contract price of $9,000).
56. These refund cases are even rarer than the other losing-contract cases. Although it
is uncommon for a promisor to breach any contract that is a loser for the promisee, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no informed promisor will willingly withhold a performance
where he is to receive payment for more than his performance is worth-unless, of course,
he anticipates that the promisee will not pay for that performance. Id. at 491. For example,
the seller's conduct in Bush v. Canfield makes sense (particularly since the seller had al-
ready received a $5,000 payment) only if the seller was unable to acquire the flour in time
to make the required tender-a most curious circumstance where the market was declining
because of an excess supply of flour. Id.
57. By definition, payment to the promisor constitutes reliance. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. a (1981).
58. Bausch & Lamb, Inc. v. Bressler, 977 F.2d 720, 729 (2d Cir. 1992).
59. See the discussion at supra note 50. Fuller said that "the restitution interest is
merely a special case of the reliance interest; all of the cases coming under the restitution
interest will be covered by the reliance interest, and the reliance interest will be broader
than the restitution interest only to the extent that it includes cases where the plaintiff has
relied on the defendant's promise without enriching the defendant." Fuller & Perdue,
supra note 50, at 55.
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cept of the restitution interest to include disgorgement. In this situation, it
is merely a derivative of protecting the promisee's restoration interest.60
In sum, whether it is classified in terms of restitution's "unjust enrich-
ment" or more broadly in terms of reliance's "status quo," each and every
restitution remedy in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts bases recov-
ery on the value of the promisee's performance that has been received by
the breaching party. As restitution remedies, they are "restoration" resti-
tution rather than "disgorgement" restitution.61 As such, they fall into but
two general categories. 62 In the first, restitution is allowed as an alterna-
tive remedy for a material breach. As previously noted, the promisee's
recovery is measured by the value of her performance even where that
value exceeds expectancy damages. 63 In the second, restitution is allowed
where the contract is unenforceable because of a contract defense, such
as the statute of frauds, mutual mistake, unanticipated circumstances, or
other invalidating cause.64 Once again, the measure of recovery is the
value of the claimant's performance in the hands of the breaching party.65
There is therefore nothing to be found in the remedial scheme of Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts that supports a "disgorgement" restitution
remedy as proposed by § 39 of the new Restatement of Restitution.
III. THE DISGORGEMENT INTEREST IN THE COMMON LAW
OF CONTRACT AND IN THE LAW REVIEWS
Over a half century ago, Jack Dawson wrote for a symposium on con-
tract remedies a short article succinctly titled "Restitution or Dam-
ages?" 66 He found little law to support a disgorgement remedy for breach
of contract: "We can be quite sure that a ... claim [to disgorge profits]
presented at law in an action framed as a damage action would ordinarily
receive a very short answer: damages are to cover the promisee's loss, not
the defaulter's gain."'67 Although the rapidly developing enrichment in
the law of remedies, particularly restitution, gave him hope for the emer-
60. Kull, supra note 13, at 2042-44.
61. The Restatement's definition of the "restitution interest" is not expressed in terms
of "unjust enrichment" but in terms of the promisee "having restored to him any benefit
that he has conferred on the other party." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344
(c) (1981).
62. A closely related category is for contracts implied-in-fact. See, e.g., Maglica v. Mag-
lica, 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 101, 109 n.14 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2005). In these cases, where the
evidence does not otherwise establish a price, the promisee is allowed to recover the rea-
sonable value of her performance. Id. at 104. Here, however, the remedial goal is to honor
the promisee's expectancy interest. These cases deserve mention here because they often
say that recovery is in restitution for the quantum meruit value of the goods or services
received. See id. at 109 n.14. ("Because an implied-in-fact contract can be found where
there is no expression of agreement in words, the line between an implied-in-fact contract
and recovery in quantum meruit - where there may be no agreement at all - is fuzzy
indeed.").
63. See Bush v. Canfield, 2 Conn. 485, 487 (Conn. 1818).
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 375-377
65. See id.
66. John P. Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 175 (1959).
67. Id. at 186.
2015]
SMU LAW REVIEW
gence of a general disgorgement remedy for breach,68 he conceded that:
On the whole, however, the recapture of profit made through breach
of contract, unaggravated by violation of 'fiduciary' or 'confidential'
obligations, has been brushed aside as an objective of our remedial
system, unless the gain can be somehow conceived as a performance
or the product of some performance [rendered by the promisee]. 69
Even so, he concluded optimistically:
For when a purpose so broad and attractive as the prevention of
gains through another's loss is projected on a legal system, it will
surely be refracted like light in a prism. If we study the angles of
refraction closely they fall into patterns we can well understand. 70
And that is just what happened. The refractions began to radiate as
courts, in an increasing number of identifiable categories of cases, al-
lowed promisees to recover a breaching promisor's profits where the dis-
gorgement was found to be especially compelling. In turn, beginning with
Daniel Friedmann's 1980 article, 71 Dawson's call for a disgorgement rem-
edy in contract began to garner significant attention in the law reviews.
Using the developing caselaw scholars formulated various general theo-
ries to identify the remedy's boundaries. 72 Friedmann painted with broad
strokes. He argued that the principle allowing the injured party to waive
the tort of conversion and to sue instead in restitution should apply simi-
larly to breaches of contract. 73 In Friedmann's view, for most contracts
the promise to perform becomes a property or "quasi-property" right of
the promisee.74 When the promisor breaches opportunistically, she mis-
68. Dawson emphasized two categories of cases. See generally id. In the first, disgorge-
ment of profits-"preventing gain through breach"-influenced the court's choice of the
larger of two available damage measurements of the promisee's expectancy interest. Id. at
188. He emphasized, in particular, Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235 (Minn. 1939),
in which the court chose to award damages based on the cost of restoring the realty rather
than on the basis of the comparatively slight diminished value of the land. Dawson, supra
note 66, at 188 n.28. Other commentators have emphasized the breach's willfulness as the
justification for a higher damage award. See Patricia Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Fac-
tor in Choosing Remedies for Breach of Contract, 24 ARIz. L. REV. 733, 741-56 (1982);
Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521,
571 (1981). This refinement of Dawson's point is appropriate; it is the breach's willfulness
that justifies preventing the "gain through breach." See Marschall, supra, at 742. The higher
damage award would be less compelling if the promisor's motives in breaching were not
opportunistic. Muris, supra, at 571.
In Dawson's second category, the courts awarded disgorgement of profits as a "substi-
tute measure" of expectation damages. Dawson, supra note 66, at 188. In this category
were cases in which the promisor had violated exclusive territorial rights granted to the
promisee by the contract, but the promisee was unable to prove damages with reasonable
certainty. Dawson, supra note 66, at 188-89.
69. Dawson, supra note 66, at 189.
70. Id. at 192.
71. Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of
Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504 (1980).
72. Much of the important literature, both from the United States and Commonwealth
jurisdictions, is collected in Restatement (Third) § 39, reporter's note a.
73. Friedmann, supra note 71, at 504.
74. Id. at 507-08.
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appropriates that property interest just as in the case of a conversion of
tangible property and, as with the tort, the promisee should be entitled to
waive the breach and recover the promisor's ill-gotten gains. 75
In his 1985 article, Allan Farnsworth questioned Friedman's approach,
arguing that his analogy of contract rights to tangible property was unper-
suasive.76 In particular, Farnsworth suggested that to extend the tort-
waiver principle to the appropriation through breach of the promisee's
right to performance would extend the disgorgement remedy too broadly,
with "little guidance" for separating out cases in which the remedy was
not warranted. 77 In Farnsworth's view, all of the persuasive cases relied
on by proponents of a disgorgement remedy for breach could be grouped
broadly into two categories: those involving breaches by "fiduciary"
promisors, and those in which a seller of land or goods had profitably
resold property after a legally recognized interest in it had passed to the
purchaser. 78 In the first category, strong policy reasons favor disgorge-
ment.79 In the second, the buyer's property interest80 justifies disgorge-
ment just as in the tort-waiver cases for conversion and trespass.,,
Farnsworth favored extending the disgorgement remedy beyond these
categories to only "a limited class of cases," those involving what he la-
beled "abuse of contract. '8 2 He said that abuse of contract exists if the
promisor realized a gain from the breach but the promisee is "left with a
defective performance and no opportunity to use [his own] performance
to attempt to obtain a substitute. '83 He gave two primary examples of the
75. Friedmann's view would allow disgorgement for most opportunistic breaches. But
not all-only for those in which the promisee is entitled to the promisor's performance in
such a way that the breach leaves the promisee "deprived of an interest that 'belonged' to
him[.]"/d. at 515. For example, his theory would not apply to contracts to lend money
because the money used by the promisor to garner the gain could "not be 'identified' as the
very sum to which [the promisee] was entitled[.] . . ." Id. at 521. Nor would it apply to
disgorge a higher salary taken by an employee in breach of an employment contract be-
cause, for policy reasons, the law does not consider an employer's right to the labor of his
employee to be a property right.Id. at 520-21. In a subsequent article, Friedmann refined
his appropriation theory, suggesting that disgorgement should apply only to gains (or sav-
ings) that were directly attributable to the breach. Daniel Friedmann, Restitution for
Wrongs: The Measure of Recovery, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1879, 1899-1904, 1917-23 (2001). His
analysis in this regard dovetailed with that of Allan Farnsworth. Allan Farnsworth, Your
Loss or My Gain? - The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94
YALE L.J. 1339, 1343-50 (1985).
76. Farnsworth, supra note 75, at 1363 n.93.
77. Id. Farnsworth noted that Friedmann readily conceded that his approach failed to
provide a means for determining when contract rights should be treated as property for
purposes of a disgorgement remedy.
78. Id. at 1353.
79. Id. at 1357 n.69.
80. In the case of sales of goods, for example, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [U.C.C.]
§ 2-501 provides that, upon identification of the goods to the contract, the buyer at a mini-
mum acquires a "special property" interest. In some situations identification may result in
the buyer acquiring full title to the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-401(3)(b).
81. See discussion in supra notes 26-27.
82. Farnsworth, supra note 75, at 1382, 1392.
83. Id. at 1384.
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types of cases he had in mind.84 The first was those involving a "skimped
performance," which he said presented a most compelling example of the
need for a disgorgement remedy for breach. 85 In skimped performance
cases, the promisor breaches by rendering a cheaper (and usually infer-
ior) performance under circumstances in which the promisee can demon-
strate no expectancy damages. 86 The prototypical case example involves a
construction contract in which the contractor has deviated from the con-
tract specifications by installing less expensive plumbing pipe. 87 The
deviation caused no diminution in the structure's value, and the cost of
tearing it down and installing the correct pipe would have been grossly
excessive. 88
Farnsworth's second example was cases in which the promisor's per-
formance has become impossible because of time's passage but, mean-
while, the promisor has profited from his breach.89 The situation can arise
in myriad contexts. The promisor, for example, may have wrongfully
delayed tendering goods and used the goods during the delay to earn a
profit.90 Or a lessee may have profitably subleased the premises in viola-
tion of the lease terms, but the default is not discovered until after the
lease has expired.91 In both these situations, the promisee may have suf-
fered no provable damages-the value of the goods received by the buyer
being as warranted (and the buyer having suffered no provable damages
from the delay), the lessor having been paid the full rental by the lessee.
Farnsworth emphasized that, in abuse of contract situations, disgorge-
ment is appropriate regardless of the enriched promisor's motivation. It
matters not whether her breach was innocent, willful, or somewhere in
between; 92 an innocent breaching party would be just as liable as a willful
84. Farnsworth did include as a third example cases in which disgorgement is properly
an "indirect solution." Id. at 1375 n.137. In these cases the gain of the breaching promisor
is used by the courts as a rough measure of the promisee's expectancy damages. Id. Al-
though the award results in disgorgement of the promisor's gain, the intent is not to protect
the restitution interest. Id. at 1376. The disgorgement is but an "indirect" consequence of
protecting the promisee's lost expectation. Id. As noted above, this is one of the categories
identified by Dawson in his 1959 article. See Dawson, supra note 66, at 188.
85. This example had also been identified by Friedmann in his 1980 article. See Fried-
mann, supra note 71, at 522-25. The apt phrase "skimped performance" was later used to
describe this type of case by Lord Wolff in Attorney General v. Blake, [1998] Ch. 439 (Eng.
C.A. 1997), appeal dismissed, [2001] 1 A.C. 268, (2000) 4 All E.R. 385 (H.L. 2000). It is
now commonly used in discussions of the disgorgement remedy.
86. Friedmann, supra note 71, at 522-25.
87. This example is based on the facts outlined in the famous case Jacob & Youngs,
Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
88. Id. at 891.
89. Farnsworth, supra note 75, at 1385.
90. This example was also given by Friedmann in his earlier article. Friedmann, supra
note 71, at 518.
91. This example appears in Restatement (Third) § 39, illus. 8 and is based on Long
Building, Inc. v. Buffalo Anthracite Coal Co., 74 N.Y.S.2d 281 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947).
92. Farnsworth,supra note 75, at 1391-92 ("Any extension of the disgorgement princi-
ple should be without regard to the character of the breach.") In Farnsworth's opinion
willfulness was too mercurial a concept with which to burden the courts in determining
whether disgorgement was the appropriate remedy. The line between "will not" and "can-
not" perform is significantly fact-specific and will often be confounded by self-serving at-
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one. Conversely, the measurement of the amount to be disgorged would
be limited by a "strict requirement of cause in fact."'93 Causation was a
cornerstone of Farnsworth's proposal. Disgorgement would be allowed
for only the amount of gain or savings directly attributable to the breach.
In this regard, willful and innocent breaching parties would be given the
same credits and offsets for benefits and savings. 94 All promisors would
be credited with a deduction for any portion of the profit directly attribu-
table to her individual industry and initiative, 95 and the promisee would
not be entitled to gains resulting from remote causes.96
Further, apparently to reduce the disgorgement amount to its absolute
minimum, Farnsworth used a variation of the causation principle to argue
that the amount disgorged should not be the entire gain, but only the
"saving of the cost of other means." "Other means" could take one of
two forms-"saving of the cost of substitution" or "saving of the cost of
modification." The idea, oddly enough, was that the promisor should be
given the benefit of opportunities that were potentially available to him
tempts of promisors to conjure legal justifications for their breaches. Id. at 1384 n.156.
Regardless, in Farnsworth's opinion "[a] breach motivated by a desire for gain seems
plainly willful under any definition of the term." Id.
93. Id. at 1342.
94. In this regard, Farnsworth deviated from the customary restitution principle that
"fault may be relevant to the measure of unjust enrichment and other features of restitutio-
nary remedies." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1 cmt. f.; cf id. § 49(3) (listing four different
ways for measuring unjust enrichment with § 51, adding rules designed to disgorge profits
or other secondary benefits of "conscious wrongdoers"). The courts often use similar prin-
ciples to limit damage recoveries in restitution-like cases, reaching results that are indistin-
guishable from disgorgement. In trespass cases, for example, where the defendant has
wrongfully removed gravel, coal, oil, gas, or other minerals from property owned by the
plaintiff, the wrong may have caused little if any decrease in the market value of the realty.
The plaintiff then sues for damages for the tort of trespass. An action in restitution is not
available because of the traditional rule discussed above. See supra note 27. Trespass dam-
ages are allowed for the value of the property wrongfully taken, with the measurement of
that value dependent on the willfulness of the defendant's wrong. If the trespass was inno-
cent, the plaintiff's recovery is limited to a reasonable royalty that the plaintiff could have
received had she leased the mineral rights. This measure allows the defendant to retain any
profits resulting from a sale of the minerals. In cases in which the plaintiff was capable of
extracting the minerals herself, damages are measured by the value of the minerals less the
costs of extraction. This measurement takes the profits from the defendant, awards them to
the plaintiff, but allows the defendant a deduction for the reasonable cost of extraction. See
Kroulik v. Knuppel, 634 P.2d 1027 (Colo. App. 1981) (discussing these measurements in
action by owner who acquired title by adverse possession against owner of record; damages
measured by reasonable royalty); see also Young v. Ethel Corp., 581 F.2d 715 (8th Cir.
1978); Alaska Placer Co. v. Lee, 553 P.2d 54 (Alaska 1976) (royalty or market value less
production costs); Hunt v. HNG Oil Co., 791 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi May
3, 1990, writ denied) (value of minerals less production costs). Where the trespass was
willful, however, some courts have adopted a punitive measure of the value of the minerals
at the surface with no deduction for their extraction costs. See Payne v. Consolidation Coal
Co., 607 F. Supp. 378 (W.D. Va. 1985) (good faith trespasser liable for compensatory dam-
ages only; bad faith trespasser liable for higher measure based on market value at time
trespasser uses or sells property wrongfully taken). Restatement (Third) § 39 illus. 2 takes a
similar fact situation and treats it in a disgorgement context. The illustration is based on
Laurin v. DeCarolis Construction Co., 363 N.E.2d 675 (Mass. 1977).
95. Farnsworth, supra note 75, at 1347-49.
96. So, for example, the promisee would not be allowed to trace the promisor's ill-
gotten gains into still more profitable ventures. Id. at 1349-50.
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had he more appropriately chosen one of them rather than to breach. To
illustrate, assume in the skimped-services paradigm that, instead of
breaching, the promisor had negotiated a settlement in which the prom-
isee agreed to accept the substitute performance in exchange for the
promisor's sharing some of the savings with him. The amount the prom-
isee theoretically would have agreed to accept would represent the "sav-
ing of the cost of modification" and, correspondingly, the amount that
should be disgorged. Or, using the delayed-performance paradigm, as-
sume that the promisor could have purchased identical goods in substitu-
tion for those contracted for and still have earned the profit. The amount
that the promisor could theoretically have paid for the substitute goods
would represent the "saving of the cost of substitution" and, correspond-
ingly, the amount that should be disgorged. 97
The next noteworthy foray in the law reviews was by Andrew Kull, the
Reporter for the new Restatement of Restitution, writing over a decade
before the Restatement was published.98 As discussed above, a good por-
tion of the article was devoted to demonstrating the absence of a dis-
gorgement remedy for breach in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
(as well as in the common law). 99 Like Farnsworth, Kull opined that dis-
gorgement for breach should be allowed in only "a limited class of
cases"1°°: those involving instances of profitable and opportunistic breach
as he defined those terms.101 He said that his concept of "opportunistic
breach" and Farnsworth's concept of "abuse of contract" frequently
would capture the same disgorgement cases, and he concluded his article
by calling for the narrow disgorgement remedy, "whatever its ultimate
contours, that Professor Farnsworth has long recommended. 1 02
97. In his 2001 article, Friedmann seconded Farnsworth's position requiring a "causal
connection between the interest appropriated from the plaintiff (or the breach of duty
owed to him) and the accrued profits." Friedmann, supra note 75, at 1924. Friedmann
agreed with many of Farnsworth's examples of how the causation requirement should be
applied.
98. Kull, supra note 13, at 2021.
99. As discussed supra in Part II, Kull demonstrated that the Restatement of Contract's
restitution interest deals entirely with restoration and that, therefore, it was in effect re-
dundant with the reliance interest. He suggested that the Restatement's reference to the
restitution interest could be eliminated entirely and replaced by the disgorgement interest.
Id. at 2053.
100. Id. at 2044.
101. Kull said that "a breach is 'profitable' if the defendant's liability for contract dam-
ages is less than the cost of the defaulted performance; it is 'opportunistic' if the defendant,
by electing to breach, is attempting to improve on the terms of contractual exchange, man-
aging either to give less or to take more than the parties had agreed." Id. at 2021 n.1.
102. Id. at 2053. A bane of all Reporters, whether of a restatement, uniform law, or
other piece of legislative material, is that their publicly stated opinions are too often taken
as gospel of the true meaning of the final product. Familiarity with the drafting process,
however, should quickly disabuse one of the notion. This article will attempt to keep sepa-
rate Professor Kull's academic writings and the text and commentary of the new Restate-
ment. The obvious exception will be the Restatement's "Reporter's Notes," which can be
taken as statements of the Reporter's observations. But in particular, his qualifier
"whatever its ultimate contours" in his 2001 article suggests that he may not have finished
thinking about the disgorgement remedy in § 39 of Restatement (Third), which was pub-
lished more than a decade later. Also, although Kull did not emphasize the point in his
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However, in his 2007 article, Melvin Eisenberg took a position discor-
dant with the harmony between Farnsworth and Kull. 10 3 He expressed
disappointment (as had Kull) that the Restatement of Contracts had not
expressly provided for protecting the disgorgement interest. 10 4 He
pointed to "more than a dozen" American appellate-level cases that had
awarded disgorgement for breach, as well as cases from the high courts of
Commonwealth countries. He argued that the smattering of American
cases that have refused to allow the disgorgement remedy were wrongly
decided. Although he conceded that the relevant case law did not support
a general disgorgement remedy for breach of contract, he concluded that
there was also insufficient case law to justify the Restatement's categorical
disregard of the remedy.105
In Eisenberg's view, a restoration remedy for breach should be much
broader than that contemplated by Farnsworth. 0 6 He noted that, because
of the well-documented deficiencies in the rules for recovering expecta-
tion damages, 10 7 protecting the expectation interest will often fail to pro-
vide proper incentives for performance and "to effectuate contracts. 10
8
In these cases, promisors will be encouraged to breach in order to take
advantage of more lucrative post-contract opportunities, because the
rules allow them to under-compensate the promisee and garner the re-
sulting benefit. He concluded that recognition of the promisee's disgorge-
ment interest would deter these opportunistic breaches and stabilize
contract expectations.
article, unlike Farnsworth's "abuse of contract" notion, his concept of "opportunistic
breach" required an intentional breach. See id. at 2021 n.1 (emphasizing that an opportu-
nistic breach does not include all profitable breaches but only those where "the defendant,
by electing to breach, is attempting to improve on the terms of the contractual exchange[ ]"
(emphasis added)). This difference of opinion became especially significant in framing Re-
statement (Third)'s "ultimate contours" for its disgorgement remedy. The Restatement re-
solves the conflict in Kull's favor. Before the Restatement, however, Kull's article stood
alone in limiting the remedy to cases of intentional ("deliberate") breach.
103. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MIcH. L.
REV. 559 (2006).
104. Id. at 564-66. Eisenberg said that there was ample caselaw existing when the sec-
ond Restatement was published to support including the disgorgement interest within its
provisions. Allan Farnsworth, the Reporter for the greater portion of the Restatement, had
previously reached a contrary conclusion. Farnsworth, supra note 75, at 1369. He said that
statements in the available cases supporting disgorgement were "widely scattered, do not
cite each other, and show no coherent pattern." Id.
105. In this regard he echoed Professor Dawson's earlier optimism. See Dawson, supra
note 66, at 192; see also 1 GEORGE. E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 438 (1978)
("Although the issue [of a disgorgement remedy for breach] has gone largely unex-
plored ... it cannot be wholly rejected.").
106. Eisenberg had particular difficulty with Farnsworth's causation arguments for lim-
iting a disgorgement remedy, finding them "flawed." Eisenberg, supra note 103, at 566-70.
This writer shares those reservations. Farnsworth's arguments can largely be resolved by
apportioning the amount of disgorgement rather than by denying it altogether.
107. The literature exposing the deficiencies of expectancy damages is voluminous.
Daniel Farber and Alan Schwartz have provided particularly helpful analyses. See Daniel
Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Con-
tract, 89 VA. L. REV. 1443 (1980); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89
YALE L.J. 271 (1979).
108. Eisenberg, supra note 103, at 577.
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As Eisenberg was well aware, these arguments were not new. The inad-
equacies of expectancy damages to provide full compensation has always
been a staple in the call for a disgorgement remedy in contract law. In-
deed, most of Eisenberg's examples of the types of cases to which dis-
gorgement should extend were those previously pointed to by other
scholars and are the same types that are used as illustrations in § 39 of the
new Restatement.
Eisenberg argued, however, that the disgorgement remedy should be
extended even further than others had previously suggested. He main-
tained that disgorgement is "almost always appropriate" 10 9 where it has
been bargained for-in the sense that the promisee has "paid" for the
disgorgement.' 10 A clear example of what Eisenberg had in mind would
require but a slight variation in the facts of the well-known case
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Co.1"1 Garland had breached a covenant to
restore the Peevyhouses' property after conducting a strip-mining opera-
tion. In return for conveyance of the mineral lease, Garland agreed to
pay the Peevyhouses a royalty on the mined coal. The Peevyhouses in-
sisted that the restoration covenant be included in the lease. Garland did
not restore the land as promised, leaving a diminution in its value of only
$300. It would have cost the Peevyhouses $29,000 to have the restoration
work done by a third party. The court limited the damage recovery to the
diminution in the value of the land. If, however, we add to these facts that
Garland had agreed during negotiations to include the covenant, but only
in exchange for a reduction in its royalty payment, it becomes clear that
the Peevyhouses had "paid" for the restoration covenant by agreeing to
accept the reduction. Eisenberg said that in these circumstances Garland
Coal "should at least be required to disgorge the expected cost of restora-
tion at the time the contract was made," regardless of whether Garland's
failure to restore resulted in any diminished value of the realty.11 2
Had Eisenberg's variation represented the actual facts, the
Peevyhouses should, and probably would, have been awarded the reason-
able cost of restoration. Few, however, would consider this a disgorge-
109. Id. at 601.
110. Eisenberg maintained that "it is normally implied in a contract for the sale of a
commodity that the seller will neither seek out nor accept offers from overbidders." It
follows, therefore, that "a buyer will normally pay an implicit premium for that promise."
The first implication is unarguable. Contract law regards accepting offers from "overbid-
ders" as wrong, and it calls them "breaches" or, at a minimum, "anticipatory repudiations."
And contract law frowns upon sellers seeking out overbidders after contracting. It treats
such actions as giving the promisee "reasonable grounds for insecurity" and then arms the
promisee with self-help remedies, including in some circumstances the right to suspend
performance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-609(1977). But, as explained below, Eisenberg's first implication does not usually lead to his
second.
111. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
112. Eisenberg, supra note 103, at 595. Restatement (Third) § 39 illus. 5 poses the identi-
cal situation). Eisenberg does not explain why he designates the amount to be disgorged as
the anticipated cost at the time of the contract. The promisees "paid" for restoration of
their property, and the measure of that value should be at the time restoration should have
occurred-the time of the breach.
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ment of Garland's savings because the cost of restoration would be the
proper measurement of the Peevyhouses' expectation damages. 113 If dis-
gorgement were the goal, the Peevyhouses' recovery would not be based
on what it would have cost them to have the land restored, but on what it
would have cost Garland-its savings-to perform the work. The latter
sum would presumably be the lesser, because it would not include the
profit for the work reflected in the market price that the Peevyhouses
would have had to pay. Disgorgement would actually undercompensate
the Peevyhouses.
Eisenberg then extended his analysis. He abandoned his Peevyhouse
variation and returned to the actual facts of the case. He suggested that
even without an express agreement, in many contracts the promisee can
be said to have "implicitly" paid for the right of disgorgement. The prom-
isee does this, in Eisenberg's view, because both parties at the time of
contracting know that, between the time of the contract and its perform-
ance, a third party "overbidder" may come along to offer the promisor a
higher price. An "economically rational" seller thus will price the per-
formance to the buyer at a premium 14 to include the value of the seller's
assuming the risk that an overbidder will emerge. In turn, the buyer,
knowingly or not, will pay this premium, thereby implicitly paying for the
right to disgorge the seller's profits if he subsequently deals with the
overbidder.
Eisenberg's suppositions ask a good deal of sophistication of "economi-
cally rational" sellers. Sellers typically charge as much as they think the
market will bear or, in negotiated transactions, as much as the particular
buyer will pay. Buyers pay as little as they think the seller will accept, and
no more than the performance is worth to them. Somewhere in this mud-
dle of day-to-day trading there may-or may not-be an implicit charge
by the seller to guard against the likelihood of a better deal coming
along.11 5 Sellers, however, are unlikely to factor this probability into the
113. Eisenberg clearly recognizes that in these situations the expectation interest per-
forms the function of disgorgement. Eisenberg, supra note 103, at 582. He also emphasizes
that this is true in many different contexts, and he suggests that this is one reason why we
do not see more disgorgement contract cases. Id. at 597-98. What is not clear, then, is why
a disgorgement remedy is necessary in his "implicit premium" cases, which would be better
resolved by an award of expectation damages for the cost of restoration.
114. "The amount of this premium will be the expected value of an overbid, based
roughly on a probability-weighted average of potential overbid prices." Id. at 581.
115. Eisenberg does not explain why there could not just as well be an implicit discount
to guarantee a quick sale because the seller needs money or simply wants to insure that the
buyer does not take her business elsewhere. If the buyer then breached in order to
purchase other property at less than the breached contract price, surely Eisenberg's theory
would not extend to allow disgorgement of the buyer's savings based on an argument that
the seller implicitly "paid" for the right. In contrast, Steve Thel and Peter Siegelman main-
tain that there are indeed "promisees who bargain for nothing more than the benefit of
their bargains [and who] will not want to pay a premium for the right to receive more than
expectation in case of any breach, willful or otherwise." Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman,
Willfulness Versus Expectation: A Promisor-Based Defense of Willful Breach Doctrine, 107
MICH. L. REv. 1517, 1518 (2009). They suggest, however, that contracting parties would
almost always agree ex ante that certain types of particularly egregious breaches would be
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pricing unless the probability is high. If the seller believes that a better
buyer will probably present herself in the short term, a rational seller
either will not sell to the underbidding buyer or will, as Eisenberg sug-
gests, charge a price near the price anticipated from the overbidder. In
this circumstance, the buyer will pay no more than he values the goods,
and he may or may not know that the seller has implicitly hiked the price.
Either way, the buyer's assent to the price is based on his own value of
the seller's performance. Certainly, as would anyone, the buyer would
agree that he paid both for the seller's performance and, implicitly, for
the seller's promise not to breach. That is what every contract entails. It
stretches reasoning, however, to assume that the buyer would agree that
he paid some implicit premium for that inherent contract right.
Eisenberg did not intend for his "implicit premium" theory to extend
to all contracts. He would probably agree that his analysis does not work
for goods and services that are available generally in the marketplace.
Those are plentiful, and if an overbidder comes along the seller can ac-
commodate her with an additional performance. Eisenberg's examples
for "implicit premium" cases are confined to those in which the seller's
agreed performance is in limited supply-the sale of land and the sale of
antiques or other "differentiated" ' 1 6 goods. Regardless, even granting the
validity of his analysis, Eisenberg's theory goes as much to support a mea-
surement of lost expectation damages as it does to support disgorgement.
The relevance of the buyer's implicit payment should in this respect be
treated no differently than the explicit payment in his Peevyhouse
variation.
IV. THE ELEMENTS OF § 39
The disgorgement remedy in § 39 of Restatement (Third) of Restitution
is best understood in context with the case law and academic literature
capsulated in the discussion above. 117 It is intended to fill a gap in the
"out of bounds," and that with respect to those breaches promisors implicitly agree to an
increased liability that may exceed the promisee's actual expectancy damages. Id. at 1519.
116. Here, "differentiated" goods apparently refers to goods not generally available in
the marketplace, but not necessarily what he calls "unique" goods. Eisenberg, supra note
103, at 581 n.58.
117. The new Restatement of Restitution provides:
§ 39. Profit From Opportunistic Breach
(1) If a deliberate breach of contract results in profit to the defaulting
promisor and the available damage remedy affords inadequate protection
to the promisee's contractual entitlement, the promisee has a claim to res-
titution of the profit realized by the promisor as a result of the breach.
Restitution by the rule of this section is an alternative to a remedy in
damages.
(2) A case in which damages afford inadequate protection to the prom-
isee's contractual entitlement is ordinarily one in which damages will not
permit the promisee to acquire a full equivalent to the promised perform-
ance in a substitute transaction.
(3) Breach of contract is profitable when it results in gains to the defen-
dant (net of potential liability in damages) greater than the defendant
would have realized from performance of the contract. Profits from breach
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coverage of the remedies for breach as they are framed by Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. Otherwise, its addition to the law of restitution is
incidental. 118 The remedy, therefore, is placed with other contract-related
remedies in Chapter 4 of the new Restatement ("Restitution and Con-
tract") instead of in Chapter 5 ("Restitution for Wrongs") with all other
disgorgement remedies.'1 9 For some reason, however, its drafters appar-
ently lost sight of their objective, because they ultimately composed the
remedy with myopic conformance to the Restatement's other disgorge-
ment remedies, ones that are intended to respond to wrongs that are con-
ceptually foreign to the wrong of breach of contract. The final product
thus looks little like a contract remedy and much like an iconoclastic de-
parture from the theoretical underpinnings of contract law. As such, it
promises to be largely ignored by our courts. This may not be a bad thing
because the proposed remedy, particularly by restricting its coverage to
deliberate breaches, would actually overturn most of the well-reasoned
contract case law that it cites in support of its cause.
As discussed above, prominent writers began decades ago to ferret out
the cases that have allowed disgorgement as a remedy for breach of con-
tract. The decisions in these cases were for the most part written narrowly
and as sui generis. The academic literature, however, has used these cases
to compose various overlapping theories to support a general disgorge-
ment remedy for breach. The new Restatement borrows heavily from this
literature. The commentary to § 39 emphasizes that its goal "is to frame a
rule that will identify ... all" of the relevant court decisions.1 20 But the
provision proceeds cautiously with, as Farnsworth had put it, a "limited
extension of the disgorgement principle. '121 Regardless, whether the rule
in § 39 is regarded as a contract rule, a restitution rule, or a hybrid of
both, by giving the courts a carefully articulated general rule on which to
peg their disgorgement decisions, § 39 proposes new law.
include saved expenditure and consequential gains that the defendant
would not have realized but for the breach, as measured by the rules that
apply in other cases of disgorgement (§ 51(5)).
118. Restatement (Third) § 39(1) acknowledges that "the rule of this section is an alter-
native to a remedy for damages."
119. Id. at cmt. a.
120. See also id. at cmt. d (noting that "a claimant under this section may recover the
defendant's profits from breach, even if they exceed the provable loss to the claimant from
the defendant's defaulted performance"). As will be developed below, it is on this impor-
tant point that this article is in disagreement with § 39 on how a disgorgement remedy
should be applied.
121. See Farnsworth, supra note 75, at 1382. Almost as an apology for even the slightest
of intrusions on established law, the commentary to § 39 repeatedly emphasizes that the
occasions for its application will be "rare." See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITU-
TION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. a: "The restitution claim described in this section is
infrequently available, because a breach of contract that satisfies the cumulative tests of
§ 39 is rare." And cmt. f, which is itself titled "The exceptional nature of the claim" and is
devoted entirely to that subject, emphasizes that: "The cumulative requirements of § 39
will exclude the great majority of contractual defaults." Id. at cmt. f. Even the Reporter's
Notes echo this refrain with the fear that "even a narrow disgorgement rule will be chal-
lenged as an innovation." Id. at reporter's note c.
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The elements of § 39's disgorgement principle appear simple enough.
There are but three. First, there must have been a "deliberate breach" by
the promisor that, second, "results in a profit" to him but, third, leaves
the promisee with no available damage remedy that will adequately pro-
tect his "contractual entitlement."
A. THE PROFIT ELEMENT
The profit element would seem clear enough. In the obvious case, the
promisor will "profit" if she breaches by giving the promised perform-
ance to a third party at a price higher than the price payable under the
breached contract. The promisor will also "profit" from the breach if she
breaches because the cost of her performance exceeds both the agreed
return price and the provable damages she will have to pay for her
breach. 122 Further, § 39(3) specifies that: "Profits from breach include
saved expenditure and consequential gains that the defendant would not
have realized but for the breach... 1123
B. THE INADEQUATE PROTECTION ELEMENT
A promisee's entitlement under a contract is the performance of the
promisor.124 Any breach by the promisor ipso facto deprives the prom-
isee of a "contractual entitlement." In most cases, however, the breach
will not be one for which "the available damage remedy affords inade-
quate protection."12 5
In general, the expectancy damages allowed by contract law are always
inadequate. 126 Damages are substitutionary relief and, as such, are not
likely to be as satisfactory to the promisee as performance itself-the sub
rarely measures up to the original. More specifically, contract remedy
rules prohibit the recovery of actual damages that were not within the
contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract,12 7 damages that
the promisee cannot prove with reasonable certainty 28, and damages
that were reasonably avoidable by the promisee. 129 Also, certain types of
damages, such as those for mental suffering and for attorney fees, may
not be awarded.1 30 The fact that these types of losses commonly occur
and can be directly tied to the breach is irrelevant.' 3 ' Contract law does
not regard their protection as part of the promisee's "contractual entitle-
122. See also Restatement (Third), comment g, which addresses the appropriateness of
"saved expenditure" as a measure of recovery under § 39.
123. Id. § 39(3).
124. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUrTON & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. a.
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. a.
127. Id. § 351(1).
128. Id. § 352.
129. Id. § 350(1).
130. See id. §§ 353, 356 cmt. d.
131. See, e.g., id. § 353 cmt. a ("Even if [damages for emotional disturbance] are fore-
seeable, they are often particularly difficult to establish and to measure.").
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ment."' 32 The inadequacy of protection of the "contractual entitlement,"
then, means the entitlement normally protected by the rules of contract
law, although the protection will almost always be inadequate in the
broader sense.
Several of the illustrations provided in § 39 demonstrate this mean-
ing. 133 Illustration 17, for example, describes a situation in which an em-
ployee breaches an employment contract by taking a job that pays him an
additional $5,000 each month. 134 The employer then hires a replacement
at a salary $2,000 per month higher than was paid the breaching em-
ployee. 135 Since an award of $2,000 per month in damages will adequately
protect the employer's contractual entitlement, disgorgement of the
breaching employee's $5,000 per month profit is not permitted by § 39.136
This is so even though the services of the breaching employee may have
had special value to the employer beyond the protection allowed by the
damage award. 137 As a policy matter, contract law does not award spe-
cific performance to protect any special interest an employer may have in
the personal services of his employee. 138
Illustration 15 posits a situation where the seller breaches by selling
contracted goods at double the contract price. 139 The market price of the
goods then declines so that at the time set for performance the market
price exceeds that of the breached contract but is less than the price at
which the seller sold the goods. 140 Since damages based on market price
will adequately protect the buyer's contractual entitlement, disgorgement
of seller's profit would not be appropriate under § 39.141 Then, in nice
juxtaposition with Illustration 17, Illustration 15 makes the qualification
that disgorgement would be available if the contracted goods are unique
or a specific performance remedy would otherwise be appropriate. 142
132. See Restatement (Third), comment c, which says that in this context the inadequacy
of remedy is the same as would justify equitable relief. The comment, however, cautions
that disgorgement here is a legal remedy: "Although the inquiry directed by this section
into the adequacy of a damage remedy resembles the traditional threshold test for equita-
ble jurisdiction, stated in terms of 'adequacy of remedy at law,' it would be erroneous and
anachronistic to regard this newly-formulated rule as a species of equitable relief ... 





138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) ("A promise to render per-
sonal service will not be specifically enforced"). However, an injunction may be available
to prevent the employee from engaging employment elsewhere unless the injunction would
coerce an undesirable personal relationship or would leave the employee without another
viable means of earning a living. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(2) (1981).
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. h, il-
lus. 15.
140. Id.
141. Illustration 14 echoes this qualification for a situation in which the buyer would
have been entitled to specific performance because the buyer had a special interest in be-
ing the exclusive distributor of the breaching seller's goods. Negative covenant agreements,
such as exclusive distributorships, are discussed below in Part V.D.
142. Id. at cmt. h, illus. 15.
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Illustration 16 presents a hypothetical with exceptional facts that aptly
demonstrate the broad range of situations where damages may be ade-
quate within § 39's meaning. 143 The seller agrees to sell the buyer 1000
widgets for $500.144 The seller's normal production costs are $250 per
widget, but equipment problems have increased those costs to $350,
thereby reducing seller's anticipated profit by $100 per widget. 145 Rather
than absorbing the full reduction, the seller acquires similar widgets from
a third party for $300 each and tenders them to the buyer.146 The widgets
are nonconforming and are worth $10 less than those promised by the
seller.147 The buyer's recovery is limited to the $10 in damages. 148 Al-
though the seller clearly profited by acquiring the widgets rather than
manufacturing them, disgorgement would not be proper because "there is
no reason to conclude that Buyer's entitlement is inadequately protected
by an ordinary damage remedy. '149
Finally, a breach by nonpayment of money is the quintessential situa-
tion in which damages will provide an adequate remedy. Illustration 12
involves a situation in which a buyer of goods delays payment of his
seller's invoices and resells the goods he has not paid for in a profitable
transaction. The seller's profits are not subject to disgorgement under
§ 39 because money damages will furnish an adequate remedy."'150
As a baseline for determining whether a remedy is inadequate for pur-
poses of § 39, the commentary draws a parallel to the inadequacy situa-
tions that would have justified an award of specific performance or
injunction had the situation been caught in time.' 5 ' These are situations
that courts will find readily identifiable. The commentary says that the
disgorgement remedy is designed to perform "the same contract-reinforc-
ing objectives as [these] devices . . . at a different stage of contractual
performance.' 1 52 Indeed, disgorgement should in theory be even more
readily available because it is awarded post breach and, thus, will not
confront courts with common disincentives to awarding the equitable
143. Reporter's Note i to § 39 advises that the facts for Illustration 16 are taken from
Kull, supra note 13, at 2051 n.75. The Reporter's Note says that § 39 applies only when the
breaching party has been opportunistic. Conversely, in Illustration 16 "it is the party who
seeks specific performance (or its monetary equivalent), not the party in breach, who is
attempting to improve on the terms of the contractual exchange."





149. The buyer's damages would be $10,000 as provided for in U.C.C. § 2-714(2). The
seller's profit (based on the expenditure saved by the alternative method of performance)
is $50,000.
150. The illustration also says that disgorgement is inappropriate because of the re-
moteness of the profit from the breach. Id.
151. The commentary to § 39 repeatedly emphasizes the similarity in the situations
where the remedy of specific performance or injunction would be allowed and those that
would justify § 39's disgorgement remedy. Comment c discusses this parallel in some de-
tail, and the analogy is also made in comments a, b, and i.
152. Id. at cmt. b.
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remedies, such as hardship to the promisor or potential difficulties for the
court in supervising enforcement of the remedy. 153
Many courts and commentators have found a similarity between a dis-
gorgement remedy and the equitable remedies of specific performance
and injunction. 154 This is truly a curious and purely academic perspective.
It is one thing to note that the situations justifying the remedies are simi-
lar and quite another to suggest that the remedies themselves are alike. A
judgment for disgorgement is one of money and, unless the promised per-
formance was for payment of an agreed price, it bears no resemblance at
all to the repudiated performance. The Reporter's Note to § 39 thus goes
much too far when it says that disgorgement is "the post-breach
equivalent" of specific performance. 155 It is no more an equivalent than is
any other monetary remedy. Like money damages, disgorgement is sub-
stitutionary relief and, like money damages, it acts as no more than a
surrogate for the actual performance.
The failure of the disgorgement remedy to emulate other contract rem-
edies does not, however, undermine its importance as fail-safe protection
for contract entitlements when the other remedies cannot do the job. Dis-
gorgement should be available ex-post in most cases in which the excep-
tional remedies of specific performance and injunction would have been
given ex-ante 156 and, as discussed below, the amount disgorged should
conform as closely as the facts will allow to the value of the contract enti-
tlement it protects. It is unfortunate-bordering on the absurd-that § 39
would deny protection for many of these cases by giving primacy to the
innocence of the breaching promisor over the harm caused to the remedi-
less promisee.
C. THE DELIBERATE BREACH ELEMENT
The commentary to § 39 makes ascertaining the precise meaning in-
tended for the "deliberate breach" requirement more difficult than it
ought to be. "Deliberate" is not the customary label used by contract law
to label a type of breach. In differentiating breaches, courts usually de-
scribe them with terms like "innocent" and "good faith" on the one hand,
and "willful," "intentional," or "bad faith" on the other.157 On occasion
"deliberate" is used synonymously and interchangeably with "opportunis-
153. Id. at cmt. c.
154. See Restatement (Third) § 39, reporter's note b, which contains a helpful collection
of relevant authorities.
155. Id.
156. See Restatement (Third) § 39, comment c, which falsely promises: "If a court with
the benefit of hindsight would have granted a remedy by injunction or specific perform-
ance, restitution by the rule of this section is appropriate after the fact."
157. In the cases and literature, these variations at times mean the same thing or at
other times they can mean a different thing in different contexts or even in the same con-
text by different speakers. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Contract Lore, 27 J. CORP. L. 505,
509 (2002) (using the terms "willfulness," "deliberateness," and "bad faith" interchangea-
bly within the space of four sentences to describe the same type of breach). Professor
Hillman's usages are not exceptional.
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tic" to describe a breach designed to further the self-interest of the
breaching party at the other party's expense. 158 This usage is the one in-
tended by § 39. It would have been helpful if somewhere the lengthy
commentary to § 39 had just said that. The phrase "deliberate breach"
appears only twice in the commentary. 159 Otherwise, it is abandoned in
favor of the phrase "opportunistic breach. '160 It is an unhappy and con-
fusing curiosity that this critical requirement is not expressed in the text
of § 39, that a misleading phrase is substituted for it, and that the com-
mentary does not better clarify that "deliberate" and "opportunistic" are
intended to be synonymous. 61
The explanation for the phrasing is presumably to avoid redundancy
with § 39's inadequate remedy requirement. An "opportunistic breach" is
defined as one not only intended to take advantage of a superior oppor-
tunity, such as engaging with a third party at a higher price, but also as
one designed to take advantage of the promisee's plight in not having
158. See Five Star Dev. Resort Cmty., LLC v. iStar RC Paradise Valley, No. 09 Civ.
2085(LTS), 2012 WL 4119561 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2012) (breach was designed by defendant
to gain an economic advantage at other party's expense); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble
Lowndes Int'l, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 504, 506 (N.Y. 1994) (breach motivated by self-interest of
breaching party).
159. Comment a merely observes that disgorgement applies only to "deliberate
breaches," which it then distinguishes from unintentional breaches: "There are cases of
unintentional breach [that are] outside the scope of this section." This should not be taken
to suggest that all intentional breaches are "deliberate" or "opportunistic" ones for pur-
poses of § 39. See comment e, which emphasizes for § 39 purposes that a breach must be
both "intentional and opportunistic." The other reference to "deliberate breach" is in com-
ment f, which describes how the elements in § 39 overlap. It says that a deliberate breach
includes only opportunism that leaves the promisee with an inadequate remedy: "Even
when breach is both profitable and deliberate - in the sense that it results from a conscious
choice not to perform-there is no opportunism and no claim under this section if a dam-
age remedy affords adequate protection to the promisee's contractual entitlement.
RESTATEMENr (THIRD) § 39 cmt. f.
160. As noted above at footnote 101, Professor Kull defined opportunistic breach as
one where the promisor "by electing to breach, is attempting to improve on the terms of
the contractual exchange, managing either to give less or to take more than the parties had
agreed." Judge Posner for the Seventh Circuit defined opportunistic breach as one where:
"the promisor wants the benefit of the bargain without bearing the agreed-upon cost, and
exploits the inadequacies of purely compensatory remedies (the major inadequacies being
that pre- and post-judgment interest rates are frequently below market levels when the risk
of nonpayment is taken into account and that the winning party cannot recover his attor-
ney's fees)." Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., 841 F.2d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 1988).
161. The academic literature varies considerably in describing the types of breaches
that should justify a disgorgement remedy. For example, in proposing a "workable rule"
Farnsworth said that disgorgement should be limited to cases in which the breach consti-
tutes "an abuse of contract." Farnsworth, supra note 75, at 1384. He said that a breach was
abusive when the promisor gains as a result of his breach and the promisee has no ade-
quate remedy because he is "left with a defective performance and no opportunity to use
[the promisor's] return performance to attempt to obtain a substitute." Id. He said, how-
ever, that his notion of abuse of contract differed from "opportunism," which he defined as
"self-interest seeking with guile." Id. at 1393 n.158 (quoting Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation
Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 982
n.38 (1983). Farnsworth also acknowledged that not all willful breaches are "opportunistic"
because the latter would include only ones where the breacher is not prepared to pay
damages for the injured party's loss. Id.
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access to an adequate damage remedy. 162 Since vulnerability is implicit in
§ 39's meaning for "opportunistic breach," the first sentence in the text of
§ 39163 could have been stated more simply without losing any of its
meaning: "If a defaulting promisor commits an opportunistic breach, the
promisee has a claim to restitution of the resulting profit realized by the
promisor."164
It is unclear whether the promisor need have actual knowledge of the
promisee's vulnerability or possess intent to exploit it. Comment b equiv-
ocates on these issues, saying only that "there is no requirement .. that
the claimant prove the motivation of the breaching party. ' 165 Is the intent
here to eliminate the requirement entirely or merely to shift the burden
of proof? Regardless, the outcomes of actual cases are unlikely to be af-
fected. Deliberate conduct without motive, if humanly possible, is a
pointless endeavor and, in the current context, inherently implausible.
Once caught with ill-gotten gains from deliberate conduct, the recipient
should have a near impossible task attempting to prove that his motiva-
tion was pure.
By both protecting the promisee's unliquidable "contractual entitle-
ment" and frustrating the promisor's opportunistic behavior, § 39 is said
"to reinforce the stability of the contract itself [by] enhancing the ability
of the parties to negotiate for a contractual performance that may not be
easily valued in money. ' 166 To the extent that potential liability for dam-
ages will deter a breach in a particular case, expansion of that liability to
protect otherwise unprovable losses of the promisee will correspondingly
strengthen the deterrence and work to accomplish the "broader function
of disgorgement"'167 of encouraging a negotiated buyout or settlement.
The commentary is emphatic, however, that there is no purpose in § 39 to
punish the promisor.1 68 This makes the deliberate breach requirement all
162. The phrase actually includes all three elements necessary for disgorgement be-
cause it assumes that the breach is profitable. See Reporter's Note b to § 39: "An 'opportu-
nistic breach,' for purposes of this section, is one that meets the three tests stated in§ 39(1): a breach that is profitable and deliberate, for which damages do not yield an ade-
quate remedy."
163. "If a deliberate breach of contract results in profit to the defaulting promisor and
the available damage remedy affords inadequate protection to the promisee's contractual
entitlement, the promisee has a claim to restitution of the profit realized by the promisor as
a result of the breach."
164. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 39 cmt. f: "Even when breach is both profitable and
deliberate-in the sense that it results from a conscious choice not to perform-there is no
opportunism and no claim under this section if a damage remedy affords adequate protec-
tion to the promisee's contractual entitlement ...." See also Restatement (Third), Re-
porter's Note I, which explains that Illustration 16 to § 39 is "designed to emphasize the
point that a breach of contract may be deliberate and profitable without being opportunis-
tic." Illustration 16 is discussed supra at note 142.
165. Id. at cmt. b.
166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. b.
167. Id.
168. The commentary acknowledges that punishment may be unavoidable but says in
defense that "it applies only when a remedy in damages is inadequate to protect the prom-
isee's entitlement." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
cmt. e. This truly is disingenuous. "Punishment" in a remedial context is liability in excess
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the more inexplicable. Protection of contractual entitlements would obvi-
ously be far better served by extending the disgorgement remedy to in-
clude innocent, negligent, or accidental breaches. 169
Further, only one contemplating a deliberate breach might regard a
threat of disgorgement as an incentive to negotiate a settlement as con-
templated by § 39. One who erroneously believes that his breach is justi-
fied will not be motivated to share ex ante the proceeds of his profitable
breach, as he might be if disgorgement of profitable breaches were to
extend to innocent wrongdoers.
Even where the promisor contemplates a deliberate breach, the lauda-
ble aspiration of a mutually beneficial settlement will often be under-
mined by more immediate practical concerns. Most obviously, the
breacher in many cases will not be willing to risk the loss of a profitable
opportunity while taking the time to negotiate with the promisee. The
promisor will instead breach now and worry about the consequences after
he has secured his position. Or the illicit opportunity may be so large or
the breacher so greedy that he will be satisfied with taking his gain imme-
diately and suffering consequences that will only come much later, if at
all. Or the breacher may be rationally optimistic about his chances of
success in the litigation game regardless of the substantive merits of his
case. The good guys don't always win that game. Or, most understanda-
bly, a promisor may always breach now and attempt to negotiate a settle-
ment later, a scenario that commonly ends the litigation game well before
of harm. Disgorgement punishes the promisor whenever the amount of the profit dis-
gorged exceeds the value of the contractual entitlement being protected. When this occurs,
however, § 39 says that it intends this only as a consequence of its primary purpose of
preventing "unjust enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff." Id. at cmt.
a; see also id. at cmt. e ("While the rule of this section is intended to make breach unprofit-
able, it does not seek to punish a breach of contract by requiring forfeiture of the defen-
dant's profit from the transaction as a whole."). In Part VI below, this article argues that
§ 39 errs by not limiting the amount disgorged to a fair measure of the promisee's loss.
Doing so would better accomplish § 39's avowed purpose of protecting contractual entitle-
ments without punishing breaching promisors. Id.
169. As discussed above in Part III, none of the calls for a disgorgement remedy in the
academic literature (not by Dawson, nor by Friedmann, nor by Farnsworth, nor by Eisen-
berg) would have conditioned its availability on the nature of the promisor's breach. The
exception was Professor Kull's, although he did not belabor the point. He talked about
"opportunistic" breaches, which he defined in part as those the promisor "elects" to do.
Kull, supra note 13, at 2021 n.1. But he concluded his article by urging a "limited" disgorge-
ment remedy like that requested earlier by Professor Farnsworth. Kull, supra note 13, at
2053. Farnsworth, even with his conservative view of the need for a disgorgement remedy
for contract law, was abundantly clear that the remedy should apply regardless of the in-
tent of the breaching promisor. Farnsworth conceded that at times contract cases do em-
phasize the willfulness of the breach, but he said that those cases go against the deep grain
of the law of contract that "generally treats unwilling breaches in the same way as knowing
breaches committed to realize gain." Farnsworth, supra note 75, at 1391. He therefore con-
cluded that "the concept of abuse of contract should not be limited to situations in which
the breach is in some respect intentional .... Indeed, it would be hard to implement a
distinction based on the character of the breach. Given the eagerness of contracting parties
to find possible legal justification for nonperformance where this is to their advantage,
having to decide whether, and perhaps to what extent, a breach was committed knowingly
would place a heavy burden on courts. Any extension of the disgorgement principle should
be without regard to the character of the breach." Id. at 1391-92.
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formal court proceedings. And in all cases a deliberate breacher who is
burdened with some pesky moral inclination to do right is always free to
rationalize momentarily that he can share with the promisee ex post a
portion of his ill-gotten gains.
Setting aside for the moment the flawed aspiration of compromise and
settlement, limiting disgorgement to deliberate breaches will still fail to
protect contract entitlements and to preserve stability of relationships in
many cases where a profitable breach leaves the promisee with an un-
provable or unquantifiable loss. This becomes especially unfortunate in
cases where the breach is actually deliberate but, given the inexactitude
of the distinction between "deliberate" and "innocent," the vagaries of
circumstantial evidence, and the varying attitudes of juries, the aggrieved
promisee simply cannot muster the required proof. Finding the border-
line between intentional and innocent breach will often require a fact-
intensive inquiry. Where that determination goes against the promisee
she will in turn be left with no remedy and with no rational explanation
for why the promisor should nevertheless profit from her loss. A law-
choice to abandon all remedial protection for vulnerable promisees in
favor of condoning enrichment of "innocent" breachers is bewildering.
From any perspective that is unwarped by preconception, a choice in
favor of a promisee who is otherwise left without remedy will always be
rationally compelling regardless of whether the breacher intended to in-
flict the promisee's plight, whether he accidentally did so, whether he
tried to avoid it and failed, or even if he thought he had a right to do so.
The commentary and reporter's notes for § 39 respond weakly to ex-
plain. We are repeatedly told that the provision has been drafted nar-
rowly to ensure the rarity of the occasion for its implementation. The
reporter's note candidly concedes that the intent is to placate unidentified
adversaries. 170 The note maintains that, although there is general agree-
ment among "observers" that a disgorgement remedy for breach is
needed, there is "wide disagreement" about the situations to which the
remedy should apply. 171 Therefore, "the present section intentionally de-
scribes a conservative rule" but, even so, with the concern that "even a
narrow disgorgement rule will be challenged as an innovation."1 72 With-
out question, § 39 is innovative in formulating a general disgorgement
remedy for contract law. But a widely supported innovation that repre-
sents a significant improvement in current law should cause concern only
to the most fundamentalist voices of the law of contract and of restitu-
tion. It is unfortunate that § 39 opts for a halfway measure merely to stifle
potential unwarranted controversy.
170. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 39 cmt. g, which is devoted entirely to explaining the "exceptional nature of the claim."
171. This statement is incorrect, however, with respect to the deliberate breach require-
ment. There has been no widespread support for the requirement either in the case law or
in the academic literature. See infra note 174. The cases are discussed below in Part V.




The reporter's note concedes that the provision denies protection for
meritorious cases, but rationalizes that "the benefits of giving § 39 a nar-
rower, more recognizable scope makes this a price worth paying. ' 173 This
woeful assessment is highly questionable. The notes and commentary for
§ 39 offer but one salient substantive reason for excluding meritorious
situations. We are told that symmetry must be maintained with the Re-
statement's disgorgement principles for wrongs other than breach of con-
tract,'174 particularly with the principle that "disgorgement remedies in
restitution are principally addressed to instances of conscious
wrongdoing.' 75
Disgorgement for wrongs other than breach is governed by
§§ 40-44.176 With the exception of § 43 addressing breaches by fiducia-
ries,'1 77 these provisions apply only against "conscious wrongdoers." For
example, the commentary to § 40, which promulgates the waiver option
for the torts of conversion or trespass,178 says that while "a conscious
wrongdoer may be liable to disgorge more than the value of what was
taken or obtained ... innocent trespassers and converters are liable in
restitution for the value of what they have required... but not for conse-
quential gains."'1 79 So for innocent wrongs in these other situations, resti-
tution is limited but not denied altogether. For example, an equitable lien
may be acquired against an innocent trespasser or converter to secure a
judgment in the amount of the injury actually caused, but recovery would
not be allowed for "consequential gains.' 80 These types of restitution-
based remedies are, therefore, readily distinguishable from § 39's dis-
gorgement remedy for breach. 181 They do bar disgorgement, but they do
not relegate worthy restitution petitioners to the dustbin of failed claims.
173. Id. § 39, reporter's note f. The note does observe that it is easier to characterize a
breacher's profits as unjust enrichment where the profits stem from a deliberate breach. Id.
It also says that the requirement of deliberate breach confines the disgorgement remedy to
the "strongest case" that would justify its implementation. Id. These observations surely
support the wisdom of the provision, but they are not valid reasons to refuse granting the
remedy in what some may consider to be less compelling cases.
174. See id. at cmt. a ("The claim described in this section is... identical in principle to
the claims... authorizing a disgorgement remedy in cases of profitable torts and equitable
wrongs ... and it is properly understood and delimited by analogy to those claims.").
175. Id. at cmt. f.
176. Restatement (Third) § 40 addresses the torts of "trespass, conversion, and compa-
rable wrongs"; § 41 addresses "misappropriation of financial assets"; § 42 addresses "inter-
ference with intellectual property and similar rights"; § 43 addresses breaches by
fiduciaries; § 44 is a residual section that addresses "interference with other protected in-
terests"; § 44(2) expressly excludes violation of "a duty imposed by contract" in deference
to § 39.
177. See id. § 43 cmt. h ("Disgorgement liability [for breach of fiduciary duty] is not
restricted to conscious wrongdoers.").
178. The matter is discussed in supra notes 25-33.
179. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTTUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40 cmt. b.
180. Id. § 50(5).
181. The reporters abound with cases applying these principles. See, e.g., Kroulik v.
Knuppel, 634 P.2d 1027 (Colo. App. 1981) (addressing three potential measurements for
plaintiff's recovery for the wrongful taking of gravel from plaintiff's land, two representing




In marked contrast, § 39's disgorgement remedy is one of last resort. The
remedy will apply only where the claimant has no other meaningful rem-
edy-to situations where she cannot adequately quantify her actual loss
in such a way that the current assortment of contract remedies can re-
spond. In these cases there is always an unhappy choice in allocating the
gain between two innocent parties. But it is not a difficult one. And in
many situations the allocation to the promisee need not be all or nothing
as § 39 would have it. The goals of maintaining symmetry with the gen-
eral law of restitution and of protecting the promisee's contractual enti-
tlement can, therefore, best be achieved by appropriately limiting the
extent of the disgorgement rather than by denying it altogether.
V. THE § 39 ILLUSTRATIONS AND THE CASE LAW
The structure of § 39 is typical of Restatement provisions. Section 39
provides 17 illustrations of its application. Most are based on the holdings
of actual cases. A few reverse the results of cases. And a few are hy-
potheticals. All of the latter two groups find some support in the litera-
ture discussed in Part III above. The illustrations are grouped into
separate categories to support commentary that immediately precedes
them. The commentary introduces principles and concepts that are neces-
sary for proper application of § 39 but cautions that the illustrations
themselves "are susceptible of various particularized explanations." 182 It
also emphasizes that "the purpose of § 39 is to frame a rule that will iden-
tify" all of the principles that have been applied to award disgorgement
for breach.183 As discussed below, however, this laudable and self-con-
gratulatory assurance quickly proves to be false. In some of the cases
upon which a particular illustration is based the court allowed disgorge-
ment although the promisor's breach was not intentional, much less "op-
portunistic" in the § 39 sense. Section 39 would not support the results in
these cases. In other cases, the courts allowed disgorgement, specifically
stating that the reason for the breach was irrelevant. Section 39 would not
agree with these cases. And in still others, although the breach was appar-
ently deliberate, that fact was not determinative of the disgorgement de-
cision. If bad conduct is evidenced by the record in these cases, it
becomes a matter of convenience that courts will cite in support of the
fairness of their decisions. Although § 39 would agree with the results in
these cases, it would have the opinions written differently.
This incoherence is exposed by the section's first illustration. It poses a
breach by a vendor of land, a pro-typical case for specific performance. In
the illustration, however, specific performance is apparently no longer
possible and, therefore, disgorgement of the seller's profit from a wrong-
182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d. The
meaning here is that the illustrations often are representative of varying, overlapping con-




ful conveyance to a third party is allowed. 184 The Reporter's Note says
that the illustration is based on two Florida cases, Coppola Enterprises,
Inc. v. Alfone185 and Gassner v. Lockett.186 In both of these cases the
courts awarded disgorgement of the vendors' profits without regard to
damages measured by the actual market value of the property. 187 In Cop-
pola, the court made no reference to the property's market value, but
concluded instead that the vendor's resale profit represented damages
necessary to protect the buyer's "benefit of the bargain. s188 In Gassner,
the court reversed the trial court's damage award and substituted an
award of the seller's profit, reasoning that the vendor should not have
been allowed to benefit from his breach. 8 9
The irony is that in neither of these cases was the vendor's breach de-
liberate and, therefore, in neither case could the court have based its
holding on § 39 had the provision existed.190 In Gassner, the court noted
that at the time of the transaction the deceased vendor had been "old,
senile and extremely forgetful," and it acknowledged that the trial record
was devoid of evidence to suggest that he had acted in bad faith.191 In
Coppola, the court emphasized that the vendee was entitled to recover
the profits earned by the vendor "whether the sale to the subsequent pur-
chaser involved bad faith or was merely the result of a good-faith
mistake."192
184. It is a nice question whether § 39 is meant to apply in situations where specific
performance was a plausible remedy had the promisee pled for it. Section 39 does not
speak to the issue but says only that "damages" must be inadequate. In the cases cited by
the Reporter's Note in support of Illustration 1, some courts emphasized that the vendor
was no longer in a position to convey the property to the original vendee, but none of the
cases addressed the converse situation.
185. Coppola Enters. v. Alfone, 531 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1988).
186. Gassner v. Lockett, 101 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1958).
187. Coppola, 531 So.2d at 336; Gassner, 101 So.2d at 34.
188. Coppola, 531 So.2d at 335-37.
189. Gassner, 101 So.2d at 34.
190. It is as if § 39 begs criticism here by selecting from hundreds of available cases to
support its premier illustration two decisions that so clearly contravene the provision's de-
liberate breach requirement. One explanation for the choice of the Gassner case is that
Dawson had used the case in his 1959 article to demonstrate a rare decision awarding
disgorgement. See Dawson, supra note 66, at 187 n.27. Reporter's Note d also refers to a
later Florida intermediate appellate court decision, Seaside Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Edwards,
573 So.2d 142 (Fla. App. 1991). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 39, reporter's note d. As did Gassner, Seaside relied entirely on the Cop-
pola case. See Seaside, 573 So.2d 142. As in Coppola, there was no allegation of a deliber-
ate breach. The vendor's defense was based on an erroneous, but apparently good faith,
interpretation of the contract at issue.
191. Gassner, 101 So.2d at 33.
192. Coppola, 531 So.2d at 335. Restatement (Third) Reporter's Note d refers also to a
contrasting case, Timko v. Useful Homes Corp., 114 N.J. Eq. 433 (N.J. Ch. 1933). But
Timko was a decision in equity imposing a constructive trust. Id. By law, conscious wrong-
doing was necessary for equity to entertain jurisdiction. Id. at 434. The defendant had ac-
quired legal title to the property at issue from the previous owner with knowledge of the
plaintiffs' interest. Id. The court ruled that the defendant thereby held the property in trust
for the benefit of the plaintiffs. Id. at 435. Upon sale of the property to a third party, the
defendants therefore correspondingly held the proceeds in trust for the plaintiffs. Id. at
434-35. The Timko decision is one of innumerable cases that apply an "equitable conver-
sion" theory whereby the vendee in a contract of sale becomes the equitable owner of the
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In sum, the relevant case law does not mandate or even support § 39's
deliberate breach requirement. That said, the case for disgorgement var-
ies with the facts. In some instances denial would be palpably unjust. In
others the case for disgorgement is strong but less compellingly so. In
these situations whether the remedy is allowed might be left to the discre-
tion of the court. The nature of the breach might then be a factor in de-
ciding whether to allow disgorgement or to limit its amount. For purposes
of making these kinds of decisions the discussion that follows slots the
§ 39 illustrations and the cases that precipitated them into definable (but
not discrete) categories.
A. SURROGATE DAMAGES CASES
These are the cases where traditional damage rules have failed but the
courts have fabricated a recovery measured by the defendant's gain from
the breach. Ostensibly they are simply expectancy damages cases. Profes-
sor Dawson, however, long ago identified these "substitute measure"'193
cases as among the first to allow, albeit indirectly, a disgorgement remedy
for breach.194 Early examples were those involving tortious infringements
of intellectual property rights where the defendants had earned profits by
infringing the plaintiff's trademark, patent, or copyright. Most of these
old infringement cases would now be governed by federal and state stat-
utes.195 Today they continue to serve, however, as precedent for disgorge-
ment as a surrogate for estimating a plaintiff's damages in various types
of claims sounding in both tort and contract.
subject property at the time of the contract. This ownership interest entitles the vendee to
recover in equity the proceeds of any sale of the property by the vendor or by a third party
who has acquired it with knowledge of the plaintiff's interest. These cases rest on readily
distinguishable principles and, therefore, are poor representatives of the disgorgement
remedy formulated by § 39, which is intended to be remedy at law. See RESTATEMENT
(THRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. c ("[I]t would be erroneous
and anachronistic to regard this newly-formulated rule as a species of equitable relief.").
193. See Dawson, supra note 66, at 188.
194. Dawson described the cases as ones in which the plaintiff could not meet the stan-
dards for proving damages with reasonable certainty "and the defaulter's profit has crept
in as a substitute measure." Id. at 188-89. He cited to several cases in which a plaintiff's
right to market exclusively in a defined territory had been infringed. Id. at 189. As dis-
cussed below in Part V.D., § 39 includes several illustrations involving breaches of various
types of negative covenants. Dawson's exclusive territory example is addressed by Illustra-
tion 14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39, re-
porter's note, illus. 14.
195. To cover gaps in the statutory coverage, § 42 provides that: "A person who obtains
a benefit by misappropriation or infringement of another's legally protected rights in any
idea, expression, information, image, or designation is liable in restitution to the holder of
such rights." Id. § 42. The commentary to this provision acknowledges the relationship
between money damages and restitution in the intellectual property cases: "To the extent
that the defendant's profits from infringement represent profits the plaintiff would other-
wise have earned, the calculation of 'infringer's profits' becomes an indirect mode of show-
ing 'plaintiff's damages,' and the same amount might be recovered under either
heading.... " Id. at cmt. d. The comment concedes that there will be overlaps between the
principles in § 42 and those in § 39: "In some other cases, the claim to profits derived from
misappropriation of a trade secret may be analyzed as a claim to profits from an opportu-
nistic breach of contract." Id. § 39 cmt. d., illus. 3.
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Where the issue is not governed by statute, courts have used various
methods to measure damages in trade secret cases, measurements that
may focus on the defendant's profits, on the market value of the secret,
on some version of a royalty, or even on the development costs of the
secret. 196 Illustration 3 to § 39 poses a situation in which a plaintiff has
communicated confidential information regarding its pricing model to de-
fendant, a potential customer, and defendant in return has promised not
to disclose the information and not to use it in competition with plaintiff
in bidding on certain leases. Defendant "deliberately" breaches the
agreement by secretly and successfully bidding against plaintiff. The
breach, however, causes no provable damages because plaintiff was only
the third highest bidder and would not have been the winner even if de-
fendant had not participated. The illustration nevertheless awards dis-
gorgement of any profits earned by defendant from the leases.
The illustration is based on Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust &
Banking Co.,197 a case in which the court on similar facts awarded the
plaintiff a constructive trust on the defendant's profits. 198 The court said
that the award was intended to serve a two-fold remedial purpose in that
"it will force the transgressor to forfeit illegally-gotten gains, and provide
compensation for the plaintiffs injury."'199 Arguably, Eden Hannon and
Illustration 3 do not fit the surrogate damages paradigm because the
plaintiff would not have been the high bidder had the defendant not
breached. The court, however, brushed this aside because the evidence
showed that the seller did not always award the leases to the high
bidder.200
The court also emphasized that the defendant's intent in breaching the
agreement was irrelevant to its decision.20' Most contract-based claims
for misappropriation of trade secrets arise from employment contracts
where the defendant has allegedly transferred trade secrets of its former
196. See Universal Comput. Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518,539 (5th Cir.
1974) (noting that the methods used to calculate damages may include the value of the
plaintiffs' lost profits, the defendant's actual profits from the use of the secret, the value
that a reasonably prudent investor would have paid for the trade secret, the development
costs the defendant avoided by the misappropriation, and a reasonable royalty). The courts
consistently limit the recovery to net profits, reasoning that a damage measurement based
upon gross revenues or gross profits would be punitive. See Univ. Gen. Hosp., LP v. Prexus
Health Consultants, LLC, 403 S.W.3d 547, 551 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 20,
2013); see also Jackson v. Fontaine's Clinics, Inc., 499 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex. 1973).
197. Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556 (4th Cir.
1990).
198. The court noted that, since no specific trust res existed, the "constructive trust" was
in essence a simple accounting for profits. Id. at 564. The court also affirmed the trial
court's injunction prohibiting the defendant from future violations. Id. The case nicely sat-
isfies the litmus test for applying disgorgement under § 39; i.e., whether specific perform-
ance or injunction would have been appropriate. Although the trial court did not find that
the defendant had breached the agreement, it granted the plaintiff an injunction against
future violations.
199. Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
200. See id.
201. See id. at 565.
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employer to its new one.2 02 The court in Eden Hannon relied heavily on
these cases. The court noted that direct evidence that an employee has
actually disclosed the trade secret is usually hard to come by and that
even an employee with good intentions would find it difficult to be effec-
tive for his new employer without using the former employer's trade
secrets. 20 3 The court therefore concluded that the former employer
should be protected whether the secret is subsequently disclosed "either
malevolently or benevolently. '20 4
The surrogate damages cases that Professor Dawson identified in his
1959 article were those involving sales made in breach of exclusive terri-
tory agreements. 205 The plaintiff faces the obvious difficulty of proving
that, had it not been for the defendant's intervention, she would have
made the illicit sales and earned the profits herself.206 The court, how-
ever, gives the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, accepts the profit earned
by the defendant as evidence of the damages suffered by the plaintiff, and
renders judgment accordingly. 20 7 The reporters abound with these types
of cases. Unita Oil Refining Co. v. Ledford20 8 is a typical case. The court
reached its disgorgement verdict summarily, simply stating that profits
from the promisor's illicit sales were relevant evidence "to make a rea-
sonably accurate estimate of the profits the [promisee] had been pre-
vented from making. °209
Although the surrogate damages cases are expectancy cases and are
not guided by restitution principles, they do represent well-accepted au-
thority for disgorging a breacher's gain when the promisee would other-
wise be denied any remedy. It is therefore extraordinary that, although
§ 39 purports to rely on these cases, it formulates a rule that would re-
verse the result in a substantial percentage of them-all those not involv-
ing a deliberate breach. Conversely, the surrogate damages theory is of
limited utility in support of a disgorgement remedy, because the courts
have for the most part confined the theory to discrete types of cases, such
as those involving infringements of intellectual property or breaches of
trade secret and non-competition clauses. 210 If the theory could be ap-
202. Id. at 560.
203. See id. at 561.
204. Id. at 562. The court emphasized that the trial court had not been able to deter-
mine definitively whether the defendant had actually used the confidential information in
violation of the agreement. Id. at 564. The court noted, however, that it was to protect
against this eventuality that the plaintiff had also included the non-competition provision,
which the defendant had definitely violated. Id.
205. Dawson, supra note 66, at 189.
206. Id. at 188-89.
207. Id. at 189.
208. Uinta Oil Ref. Co. v. Ledford, 244 P.2d 881 (1952). This case is cited with approval
in RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39, reporter's note
d.
209. Uinta, 244 P.2d at 884. The court only mentioned in passing that the promisor
knew that it was selling to customers in the defendant's designated territory. Id.
210. See Eisenberg, supra note 103, at 577, suggesting that "the best way to ensure
protection of the expectation interest may be to use disgorgement as a surrogate for expec-
tation damages, just as reliance is sometimes used as a surrogate for expectation." Id.
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plied to encompass the bulk of cases where actual damages are not prova-
ble, little need would remain for a separate disgorgement remedy for
breach.2 1 There is little likelihood of that happening.
B. "PAID-IN-ADVANCE" CASES
Several of the illustrations for § 39 are based on the surrogate damages
cases but change the courts' reasoning so as to justify a disgorgement
award.212 Illustration 6 takes a slightly different tack.213 It suggests a so-
called "paid-in-advance" theory for disgorgement that was used by the
court in Y.J.D. Restaurant Supply Co., Inc. v. Dib.214 In Dib the seller of a
small business opened a storefront in breach of a covenant not to com-
pete with the buyer of his former business within a five-block radius for a
period of three years.215 The seller then sold the competing business to a
third party who was presumably unaware of the seller's wrongdoing. 216
The original buyer sued the seller for damages and an injunction. 217 The
court granted the injunction but found that the buyer had failed to prove
its actual damages with reasonable certainty. 218 It nevertheless awarded
the buyer the profits earned by the seller from the sale of the competing
business.219 The court reasoned that it had broad discretion in equity to
fashion its decree, relying on a long line of New York cases in which the
courts in equity had disgorged profits gained from "willful and wrongful
acts. '220 The case fits the § 39 paradigm perfectly, and few would argue
with its result.22 1 The most persuasive reason given by the court to justify
211. See id. at 597-98.
212. For example, the infringement and trade secret cases overlap with the broader
disgorgement principle in § 42 for "restitution for wrongs." The non-compete cases like the
Eden Hannon case and Illustration 3 to § 39 are justified as either "negative covenant"
cases (discussed below in Part V.C.) or as "paid-in-advance" cases as discussed in this
section.
213. See id. § 39 cmt. d, illus. 6.
214. Y.J.D. Rest. Supply Co. v. Dib, 413 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979). Dib is the
rare case that does not use the profits garnered from breach of a covenant not to compete
as the measure of the plaintiff's damages. It is curious that the Restatement elects to en-
shrine a nondescript, decades-old, state trial court decision to illustrate disgorgement for
this kind of breach. There is a plethora of more representative cases, many decided by
federal courts and state courts of last resort, that reach the same result by awarding the
defendant's profits as surrogate damages.
215. Dib, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 835-36.





221. The surrogate damages theory may not have been presented at trial. The court's
reasoning in Dib is dubious precedent. New York law generally requires fraud or breach of
fiduciary duty in order to invoke equity. Fur & Wool Trading Co., Ltd. v. Fox, 156 N.E. 670(N.Y. 1927) may have been the earliest case in which the New York Court of Appeals
extended equity jurisdiction beyond fiduciary liability. The defendant was a conscious
wrongdoer, a fence who had purchased the plaintiff's property from a thief and then had
resold it at a profit. See Bradkin v. Leverton, 257 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1970) (refusing to
extend Fur & Wool to other cases of unjust enrichment). All of the equity cases cited by
the court in support of its decision involved conscious wrongdoing.
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its disgorgement verdict was that the plaintiff had already purchased the
goodwill of the business from the defendant. To allow the seller to keep
the profit from the later sale of the illicit storefront would be tantamount
to allowing him to sell the goodwill twice.222
Melvin Eisenberg's variation of the facts in Peevyhouse v. Garland
Coal & Mining Co.,223 discussed above, aptly demonstrates the strength
of the argument for disgorgement when the promissee can be said to have
paid-in-advance for the breached performance.224 The variation has the
Peevyhouses taking a reduced royalty payment for the lease in exchange
for the defendant's agreement to restore the property.2 25 The plaintiffs
would then have demonstrably paid-in-advance for restoration-the re-
duction in the royalty having been given in exchange for the defendant's
restoration covenant. 22 6 As Eisenberg correctly concludes, disgorgement
of the defendant's savings can then be justified as protection of the plain-
tiffs' expectation interest.227 It is unlikely, however, that the defendant's
savings would compensate fully for the lost expectation, because the sav-
ings would not include the additional profit that a third party probably
would charge the plaintiffs for a substitute performance. 228 Regardless,
the recovery is clearly appropriate whether the action is framed as one
for expectation damages or for disgorgement. In neither case should it
matter that the breach may not have been deliberate in the § 39 sense or
even that the plaintiffs might prudently choose to pocket the money
rather than to spend it on restoration.
Most courts would have no difficulty awarding restoration costs as ex-
pectancy damages in this kind of case. 229 American Standard, Inc. v.
Schectman,230 is an excellent case in point. Schectman involved the sale of
a pig iron manufacturing plant and related machinery located on land
owned by plaintiff.231 Defendant buyer breached a covenant in the con-
tract of sale to grade and to otherwise prepare the property for a later
sale by plaintiff.232 The court found that plaintiff had chosen during nego-
tiations of the contract to take a reduced payment for the plant and ma-
chinery in exchange for the restoration covenant, and the court therefore
222. The court also emphasized that the competing business was ongoing and would
remain in competition with the buyer. Dib, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
223. See 382 P.2d 109, 211 (Okla. 1962).
224. See Eisenberg, supra note 103, at 595.
225. Id. at 595-96.
226. Id. at 595.
227. Id. at 596.
228. Professor Eisenberg says that disgorgement should be "at least ... the expected
cost of restoration at the time the contract was made." Id. at 595. He does not explain his
reasoning. See id. If the recovery is framed in terms of disgorgement the defendant's sav-
ings are those costs that would have been incurred at the time restoration was due; i.e., the
time of the breach. See id. at 596. If the recovery is for the lost expectancy, damages should
be measured as with any other breach by the cost of a substitute performance at the time of
the breach.
229. See Schectman, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 533-34.
230. Id. at 531.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 533-34.
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awarded plaintiff damages measured by the full cost of restoration. The
court emphasized that the award was appropriate even though the bur-
den of restoration had proved to be much larger than anticipated by de-
fendant and even though the cost of completion was greatly
disproportionate to any end to be obtained by plaintiff.2 33 Defendant had
assumed these risks as part of the agreed contract price.2 34 The court cor-
rectly framed its decision entirely in terms of plaintiff's lost expectancy
with no mention of restitution or disgorgement. 235
Illustration 5 to § 39 is based upon Professor Eisenberg's variation of
the Peevyhouse case, thereby making it a paid-in-advance case like
Schectman. The illustration, of course, conditions the disgorgement on
the promisor breach being "in deliberate disregard of his contractual obli-
gations. '2 36 From a contract compensation perspective, however, it is pal-
pably wrong to say with one breath that a promisee has previously paid
for a performance and to say with the next that the law will secure the
right to that performance only against opportunistic infringers.
As with the surrogate damages cases, contract law has no need here for
the aid of restitution principles, and § 39 appears as an unwelcome inter-
meddler in its attempt to draw these cases into its fold. Conversely, con-
tract law has nothing to say regarding disgorgement if the promisee's
expectancy is less that the promisor's gain. If we assume, for example,
that in Schectman the property owner fortuitously could have mitigated
damages by having the land restored by a third party at a price apprecia-
bly less than it would have cost the breaching promisor to perform, an
expectancy damages recovery would be limited to the lower mitigation
price. Any greater recovery would be left to the restitution principles in
§ 39 and might appropriately be confined to deliberate breaches. 237
When reasonably applicable, the paid-in-advance theory presents a
particularly compelling reason for disgorgement. The theory itself, how-
ever, has no definable contours other than in situations in which the
promise at issue was specifically factored as part of the price paid.238 In
233. A widely adopted contracts casebook advises that court records suggest that the
reason Garland refused to restore the Peevyhouse property was because the coal reserves
were much less than anticipated. L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW
196-97 (4th ed. 1981). Schectman, however, should not be read as in disagreement with the
result in Peevyhouse. There was apparently no evidence in Peevyhouse that would support
a paid-in-advance theory. The dissent in Peevyhouse did emphasize that the plaintiffs
would not have signed the lease without the covenant, but there was no suggestion that a
lesser royalty was accepted in exchange for it. See id. at 115 (Irwin, J., dissenting). Also, we
are told by Judith Maute that the Peevyhouses may have chosen not to accept an advance
payment to cover the anticipated cost of restoration but insisted instead that Garland
promise to restore the land. Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Refining Co.
Revisited: The Ballad of Willie and Lucille, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1341, 1363 (1995). Evidence
to that effect apparently was not presented at trial. See Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 111.
234. Schectman, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 533-34.
235. See id.
236. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d, il-
lus. 5-7.




the clearest case, as in the Peevyhouse variation, the price paid by the
promisee and the performance refused by the promisor can be aligned tit-
for-tat so as to be identifiable as agreed equivalents. Interpreted more
broadly, the theory could logically be applied in any profitable breach
case, because binding one's self to a contract in itself represents payment
for all of the promisee's return performance. It is unlikely, however, that
courts will be inclined to extend the paid-in-advance theory much beyond
cases like Schectman, where the evidence shows a direct correlation be-
tween the price paid and the defaulted performance. 239 And, when the
theory is applied, the court will surely frame its analysis in terms of com-
pensation for the plaintiff's lost expectancy rather than in terms of pro-
tecting his restitution interest.
C. Two TYPES OF "SKIMPED PERFORMANCE" CASES:
COMPENSATION VERSUS DISGORGEMENT
The surrogate damages and paid-in-advance cases demonstrate the
strongest situations that justify disgorgement. A disgorgement remedy,
however, is not needed for them because the courts treat the defendant's
profit as a rough measurement of the plaintiff's expectation damages.
"Skimped performance" cases involve a slight, but important, variation to
the paid-in-advance cases. In them, the promisee's claim demonstrates
that she has received less than she paid for, but unlike in the paid-in-
advance cases a price paid cannot be tied directly to the promisor's
underperformance.
Even Farnsworth, as a most conservative proponent, called skimped
performance cases a "particularly important category" of his "abuse of
contract" notion for disgorgement. 240 He used as an example a construc-
tion contract in which a contractor builds with insufficient steel reinforce-
ment but causes no actual damages because the owner sells the structure
for as much as he would have received had it conformed to the contract
specifications. 241 He said that in this type of case "there is a strong moral
argument for disgorgement. ' 242 Farnsworth's example was based on a
New Zealand case, and there is also ample support for this view in the
239. Cases like Peevyhouse would then become paid-in-advance situations without the
factual variation suggested by Professor Eisenberg and Illustration 5 to § 39. The damage
recovery would be the reasonable cost of restoration regardless of its disparity with the
diminution in the property's value and regardless of whether there is any likelihood that
the promisee would use the recovery to restore the property. The courts have had innu-
merable opportunities to proceed along those lines and have shown absolutely no inclina-
tion to do so. This matter is discussed further in context with the "skimped performance"
cases in the next section, Part V.C.
240. Farnsworth, supra note 75, at 1385.
241. Farnsworth's example was based on Samson & Samson Ltd. v. Proctor [1975] 1
NZLR 655, 656 (SC) (NZ). The court awarded the owner a recovery measured by the
amount saved by the builder in using less than sufficient steel. Id.
242. Farnsworth, supra note 75, at 1386.
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cases from Great Britain. 243 Somewhat surprisingly, courts in this country
have yet to address a skimped performance breach in a disgorgement
context.244 The three illustrations of skimped performance in § 39 are,
therefore, based on a hypothetical and on two actual cases that denied
recovery to the promisee because of a failure to prove actual damages.
The § 39 illustrations reverse the results in both cases. 245
The two cases are City of New Orleans v. Firemen's Charitable Ass'n 246
and Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co. 247 In Firemen's, the prom-
isor surreptitiously provided the city with less firemen, fire hoses, and
pipe than called for by the contract, but when the contract term had ex-
pired the city had suffered no resulting damages. 248 Similarly, in the
Coca-Cola case, the promisor used a cheaper type of sweetener than that
called for by the contract in making syrup for the promisees.249 The "de-
fective" syrup, however, apparently proved to be just as tasty, and the
promisees suffered no lost sales or other provable damages.250 Notwith-
standing the absence of harm attributable to the breach, critics have re-
jected the results in both cases on the ground that it was palpably unjust
to allow the promisors to retain the savings from their un-
derperformances. 251 What goes largely unexplained is why these cases
were unjustly decided other than, as Farnsworth saw it, on moral grounds.
Are these cases somehow distinguishable from any other breach of con-
tract case where a promisor profits from breach but causes no harm,
other than in leaving a "stink in the nostrils" as suggested by Holmes? 252
Setting aside a purpose to punish, which § 39 explicitly disavows, and a
policy-based argument for preserving stability of contract, which can al-
ways be trotted out to justify extending contract remedies, these are much
weaker cases for disgorgement than are the surrogate damages and paid-
in-advance situations. They cannot qualify as surrogate damage cases be-
cause the plaintiffs have suffered no actual damages of any kind. Nor are
243. The leading case that addresses the theory is Attorney General v. Blake, [1998] Ch.
439 (Eng. C.A. 1997), appeal dismissed, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (H.L. 2000). The case is dis-
cussed below in Part V.D.
244. In Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 988 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1993), the trial
court did grant a disgorgement award, but the award was reversed on appeal on the ground
that plaintiffs had abandoned their restitution claim at trial. Id. at 397, 413.
245. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt, d.
246. City of New Orleans v. Firemen's Charitable Ass'n, 9 So. 486 (La. 1891). Restate-
ment (Third) § 39, illus. 7 is based on the facts in this case but overturns its result in favor
of disgorgement. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39,
reporter's note d.
247. 988 F.2d 386. Restatement (Third) § 39, illus. 9 is based on the facts in this case but
overturns its result in favor of disgorgement. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION &
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39, reporter's note d.
248. Firemen's, 9 So. at 488.
249. Coca-Cola, 988 F.2d at 405-06.
250. Id. at 412.
251. The argument is that in both cases the plaintiffs had paid in advance for the con-
tracted performance. See Eisenberg, supra note 103, at 593; Krull, supra note 13, at
2047-49; see also Att'y Gen. v. Blake, [19981 Ch. 439 at 294 (Eng. C.A. 1997), Ch. 439 at
294.
252. Holmes, supra note 1, at 462 (1997).
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they paid-in-advance cases unless the evidence shows that the breaching
promisor had factored the breached performance obligation into his con-
tract negotiations and had priced the performance accordingly.
When a correlation between price and performance can be shown,
however, the skimped performance has been paid for in advance. These
cases then join the others among the strongest that should qualify for
disgorgement. As Professor Kull conservatively put it, the promisee is
then "merely asking for his money back"-in effect a refund to protect
his "restoration interest. '253 But a refund in these situations should be
the minimum recovery. 254 As in other paid-in-advance cases, disgorge-
ment should be in an amount that will protect the promisee's expectancy
interest. In Professor Eisenberg's Peevyhouse variation, for example, the
recovery of the promisor's savings is justified as a rough approximation of
the value of the restoration covenant that had been "purchased" by the
promisees when they accepted a lesser royalty.2 55
Conversely, Professor Kull goes too far if he is to be taken literally
when he says that the paid-in-advance assumption is proper in all cases
that are not ones "of mutual mistake or of discharge by supervening cir-
cumstances. '256 But what of cases of minor mistakes, of supervening cir-
cumstances not sufficiently consequential to justify excused performance,
or of major mistakes or supervening circumstances of which the breach-
ing promisor has assumed the risk? The reporters abound with such cases.
Many of them represent situations in which the promisor has breached
because he had mistakenly calculated his cost of performance or because
his initially accurate estimates were skewed by unanticipated events.2 57
The paid-in-advance assumption cannot reasonably be made for those sit-
uations. Peevyhouse, in fact, was just such a case.258 The trial record
showed, not that the defendant had miscalculated the cost of restoration,
but that the available mineable coal turned out to be much less than an-
ticipated.2 59 The defendant then decided to cut its losses by not incurring
the cost of restoration. 260 Further, the trial record did not show that the
253. See id. at 2048.
254. See Eisenberg, supra note 103, at 595.
255. Neither Firemen's nor Coca-Cola qualify as paid-in-advance cases because this
kind of direct connection between the consideration paid and the performance received
was not shown. See Eisenberg, supra note 103, at 595.
256. Kull's meaning here is better understood when he describes the assumption more
narrowly, saying that the plaintiffs in these cases "can argue that they have already paid for
the performance in question, so long as we assume that the defendants anticipated the cost
of that performance and negotiated their contracts accordingly." See id. (emphasis added).
Restatement (Third) § 39 cmt. g, similarly limits the paid-in-advance assumption: "Measur-
ing damages by saved expenditure may be particularly suitable when the breach relates to
specific aspects of the promised performance that have visibly entered into the calculation
of the contract price, and when damages measured either by loss in value or cost of cure
would not yield an effective remedy to the promisee." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITU-
TION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. g.
257. See id.
258. Id. at 114.
259. FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 233, at 196-97.
260. See supra note 233.
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plaintiffs had received a reduced royalty in exchange for the restoration
covenant. Peevyhouse, therefore, was not a paid-in-advance case.261 It
would take a change like that in Eisenberg's variation to make it one.
Taking the paid-in-advance assumption too far would posit in promis-
ors an unearthly clairvoyance in anticipating costs and in pricing perform-
ances. All skimped performance cases would then fall under the paid-in-
advance umbrella, because whether the promisor has breached by ren-
dering either a defective performance or no performance at all she has
"skimped" in a performance for which she has been paid. Where the
breach leaves the promisee with an inadequate remedy the case then
would become appropriate for disgorgement.2 62 On the other hand, in
many cases it will indeed be readily apparent from the way negotiations
unfolded or from the way the contract was structured that the cost of the
skimped performance was directly factored into the contract price.
It is here that we come to a fork in the analytical road. Those skimped
performance cases that can qualify under the surrogate damages or paid-
in-advance approaches clearly may continue on as expectancy damages
cases and be governed by contract, not restitution, principles. The unfor-
tunate remainder will be diverted along the narrower restitution path to
disgorgement. Illustrations 7 and 9 to § 39 are illustrative of the divide.
Unlike Illustration 5's Peevyhouse variation, these use the unvarnished
facts of the cases they represent, the aforementioned Firefighter's and
Coca-Cola cases, respectively. The illustrations, however, reverse the re-
sults by allowing disgorgement. But the cases are distinguishable.
Firefighter's qualifies as an expectancy damages case; Coca-Cola does
not. In Coca-Cola, not only was there no showing that the plaintiffs had
paid a premium for the sweetener called for by the contract, unlike in
Peevyhouse, the plaintiffs suffered no loss of sales or other damages; this
was no surrogate damages case.2 63 Nor was there any direct relationship
between the contract price paid by the plaintiff and the savings to the
promisor from the skimped performance; this was no paid-in-advance
case. The Coca Cola situation must stand or fall purely on restitution
principles. 264
The Firemen's case is different. If it were tried today rather than over
125 years ago when concepts of contract remedies and, even more so res-
titution ones, were largely undeveloped, the evidence and theory of re-
covery would probably be presented differently and the proper result
would follow as a matter of course. Firemen's was clearly a paid-in-ad-
vance expectancy case. The contract specified with particularity the num-
ber of firemen, horses, hoses, and other fire-fighting equipment that was
to be allocated by the defendant.2 65 The defendant supplied only 70 of
261. See Peeveyhouse, 382 P.2d at 115.
262. It is on this assumption that Professor Kull would reverse the results not only in
Firemen's and Coca-Cola, but in Peevyhouse as well. Kull, supra note 13, at 2047-48.
263. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 988 F.2d 386, 411-12 (3d Cir. 1993).
264. Id. at 410-11.
265. City of New Orleans v. Firemen's Charitable Ass'n, 9 So. 486, 486-87 (La. 1891).
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the 124 firemen required and a correspondingly lesser number of the re-
quired fire-fighting accoutrement.2 66 The evidence showed almost to the
dollar the savings to the defendant resulting from its skimped perform-
ance.267 Unlike in Peevyhouse or in Coca-Cola, the plaintiffs in Firemen's
should have had no difficulty in showing that, had the contract called for
the lesser numbers actually supplied, plaintiffs would have paid a corre-
spondingly lower contract price.2 68 From an expectancy perspective the
plaintiffs did not get the higher level of fire protection they had paid for.
Conversely, the plaintiffs in Coca Cola did receive what they paid for
(albeit in slightly different form), a syrup that would make a beverage
that was satisfactory to their customers. 269
Illustration 13 to § 39 is similar to the Coca Cola case in this regard.270
It presents a hypothetical situation in which a contractor breaches by sup-
plying granite for a house's foundations that has been quarried in New
Hampshire rather than in Vermont as called for by the contract. 271 The
New Hampshire granite otherwise complies with contract specifications.
The substituted granite does not diminish the value of the completed
house, and it would cost a disproportionately large sum to remove the
New Hampshire foundation and install a Vermont one. If we substitute
plumbing pipe for granite, the illustration up to this point would be prac-
tically identical to the facts in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,272 a Cardozo
decision that has been a staple in first-year contract law classes for almost
a century. In the case, the plaintiff was denied any remedy. Illustration 13
posits that, unlike in Jacob & Youngs, the performance rendered by the
contractor costs him less than that called for by the contract- New
Hampshire granite is cheaper than Vermont granite.273 Regardless, as it
must, the illustration says that disgorgement is not available to the owner
under § 39 because the defendant's breach was unintentional.2 74 But it
266. Id. at 453.
267. Id.
268. It should not matter that the contract resulted from open bidding. Had the bid
specification numbers been lower, the resulting bids would undoubtedly have been so as
well. Professor Eisenberg says that a disgorgement of savings remedy in these cases "will
give the promisor efficient incentives to perform and therefore will effectuate the contract"
and that "in the absence of disgorgement the promisor will be unjustly enriched because
she will have been paid for a performance that she did not render." Eisenberg, supra note
103, at 593. It is not clear whether Eisenberg would go as far as Professor Kull in treating
skimped performance cases as paid-in-advance ones. In the footnote in which he uses the
paid-in-advance analogy to critique the result in Firemen's, he merely notes the result in
Coca-Cola. Id. at 593 n.89.
269. The same is true for Farnsworth's abuse of contract example that was based on
New Zealand's Samson & Samson case. The plaintiff suffered no damages because he im-
mediately resold the property at no loss in profit. See supra note 140. Farnsworth agreed
that disgorgement of savings was proper, but based his conclusion on "a strong moral argu-
ment" rather than on a paid-in-advance theory. See id.
270. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. g, il-
lus. 13.
271. Id. § 39 cmt. g, illus. 13.





then immediately attempts to transform this failed disgorgement situation
into an expectancy damages case, saying that "principles of unjust enrich-
ment reinforce the conclusion that saved expenditure makes an appropri-
ate measure of contract damages in such a case."'275 It is unlikely that a
court would buy in on this obfuscation. Illustration 13 is a no damage case
just as was Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, and it is hard to imagine a court
seeing it otherwise. The illustration's misdirection, however, does once
again highlight the unreasonable price exacted by § 39's deliberate breach
requirement.
D. NEGATIVE COVENANT CASES
The "negative covenant" cases, as the phrase is used in § 39, are mirror
images of skimped performance. The promisee has contracted for inac-
tion rather than for action, but the promisor nevertheless acts in violation
of her covenant. The promisor has promised not to do something, but he
instead does it.2 76 As with skimped performance, breaches of negative
covenants may represent a sub-category of the paid-in-advance cases.
Similarly, violation of a negative covenant that has been paid for in ad-
vance represents the stronger case for disgorgement. A clear example is
the Dib case, discussed above. 277 The case involved a seller's breach of a
non-compete covenant that was part of the sale of a business. Although
the court's decision rested on equity principles, disgorgement of the
seller's profits could easily have been justified as either surrogate dam-
ages or as compensation for an entitlement that had been paid for in
advance.
It was easy for the court in Dib to conclude that the promisee had paid
in advance for the covenant. In the purchase of an ongoing business, an
agreement by the seller not to compete is intended to protect the busi-
ness's goodwill that is being purchased by the buyer as a critical and inex-
275. See also Restatement (Third) § 39 cmts. a & d. Comment a says: "There are cases of
unintentional breach of contract, outside the scope of this section, in which the measure of
recovery applied in this section may furnish an appropriate measure of contract damages."
Comment d says much the same.
276. Restatement (Third) § 39, comment d is contradictory as to whether the negative
covenant must be explicit in the contract. It begins in the affirmative: "In a final set of
transactions, the existence of an explicit negative covenant points to the limited nature of
rights granted to the paying party under the contract. The purposes of the limitation may
be to enable the enable the promisee to sell the rights reserved at an additional price to be
negotiated in the future ... or simply to protect the promisee against potential injuries that
are difficult to quantify." (emphasis added). The comment, however, identifies Illustration
9 (based on the Coca-Cola case) as an example. No negative covenant was specified in
Illustration 9. One might be said to arise by implication from the fact that the parties failed
to reach agreement on a modification of the contract that would have allowed the promisor
to substitute an artificial sweetener in place of sugar. To infer a negative covenant in this
way would, however, be most confusing because the inference would inextricably inter-
twine negative covenants with affirmative promises. It is axiomatic that every promise to
do something carries with it the implication that the promisor will not do the polar oppo-
site. To avoid this anomaly, for purposes of this article a negative covenant is an explicit
provision.
277. The case is discussed above beginning at note 221.
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tricable part of the business entity. It is not just that the buyer would not
have done the deal without the inclusion of the goodwill;278 the deal
would have appeared ridiculous without it. And in Dib the seller not only
wrongly established a new business in competition with the plaintiff, he
later profitably resold that business, in effect selling again the goodwill he
had previously sold to the plaintiff.279
Non-compete and exclusive territory agreements are common exam-
ples of negative covenants. 280 Illustration 14 allows disgorgement of prof-
its for breach of a slightly different exclusivity covenant. 281 It describes a
sale of a farmer's entire output of ordinary goods, carrots.282 It specifies
that the buyer has an interest in being the exclusive distributor of the
farmer's carrots. The market price for carrots escalates substantially, and
the buyer breaches by selling a portion of his crop to a third party. Al-
though the buyer's damages could readily be measured by the market
price of the carrots, the remedy would clearly not protect the important
exclusivity right for which the buyer had contracted. 283
As discussed above, most of the cases dealing with breaches of exclu-
sivity covenants award the profits as surrogate damages. 284 In those cases,
as well as the paid-in-advance ones, there is no need to talk about dis-
gorgement or any other type of restitution remedy. Restatement (Third)
nevertheless co-opts them as precedent for the rule in § 39 even though
disgorgement was merely consequential to the courts' goal of compensat-
ing the promisee. Ironically, § 39 then simultaneously rejects the result in
all those that refute its deliberate breach requirement.285
There are, however, negative covenant cases that do award disgorge-
ment in situations that do not qualify for surrogate damage or paid-in-
advance treatment.286 Illustration 8 to § 39 provides a good example. It
poses a simple case of a tenant having earned a profit from subletting the
278. Otherwise, as discussed above, every material breach would be of a performance
that had been paid for in advance.
279. Y.J.D. Rest. Supply Co. v. Dib, 413 N.Y.S.2d 835, 835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
280. The concepts clearly overlap. Although exclusive territory covenants are a sub-set
of non-compete agreements, the courts tend to address them separately.
281. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. h, il-
lus. 14
282. Reporter's Note h to § 39 advises that the illustration is based loosely on the well-
known case Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948). Only the fact that
carrots are involved would seem to make it so. Otherwise any of countless other reported
decisions involving exclusive territory agreements would have done as well. Also, although
the case was an appropriate one for an award of an injunction or, alternatively, disgorge-
ment, the court's decision had nothing to do with either remedy.
283. Cf. Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975) (granting spe-
cific performance under U.C.C. § 2-716 where the damage remedy was deemed inadequate
because, although the contracted goods were readily replaceable, the type of contract, a
long-term supply contract for propane, could not be duplicated).
284. See the discussion above in Part V.A.
285. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. f.
286. As Professor Eisenberg has noted, in many of these cases "the difference between
using the disgorgement measure to protect the expectation interest and using it to protect
the disgorgement interest is not very robust." Einsenberg, supra note 103, at 588.
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leased premises in violation of a provision in the contract.287 The landlord
does not discover the violation.until after the lease has expired. 288 This is
clearly a case where the promisee would have been entitled to an injunc-
tion had the breach been discovered earlier. Disgorgement thus acts in its
stead to provide a remedy of last resort.28 9 Without some remedy to pro-
tect against breach, covenants of this type would be practically worthless,
becoming nothing more than empty memorials to good intentions.
It is here that once again we encounter the divide that also separates
the skimped performance cases. 290 Where the negative covenant protects
a right of the promisee that has pecuniary value, courts have fashioned a
remedy that loosely complies with contract's compensation principles,
particularly with what is called "restoration" restitution. Disgorgement in
cases like the sublease violation cannot represent surrogate damages be-
cause the landlord, having no possessory right in the leased premises,
could not have earned the profits gained from the subletting. Further,
there are no specific facts to show that the landlord had paid in advance
for the right to prohibit subletting. Nevertheless, before the deal was fi-
nalized the landlord did have something of value that he could have been
paid for had subletting specifically been made part of the bargaining pro-
cess. His, then, is the paid-in-advance situation as it would appear in a
mirror. The commentary to § 39 suggests that such a bargain is usually
implicit.291 To avoid treating the breached covenant as a vacuous incanta-
tion, disgorgement would restore to the promisee a right that was wrong-
fully taken. Disgorgement acts, not to protect the promisee's expectancy
interest, but as a refund to return the promisee to the status quo ante. It
protects the reliance interest just like the other restoration restitution
remedies in Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
Principles along these lines framed the decision in Wrotham Park Es-
287. The illustration is based on Long Building, Inc. v. Buffalo Anthracite Coal Co., 74
N.Y.S.2d 281 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947). The case is not a precedent for disgorgement. The
plaintiff sued in equity for an accounting to discover the amount of the tenant's profit.
Long Bldg., 74 N.Y.S.2d at 292. The court denied equitable relief on the ground that the
plaintiff had an adequate legal remedy because he could determine the amount in question
through the normal discovery process. Id. at 283. The court offered no opinion as to how
damages for the breach should be measured. Compare Joyner v. Weeks [1891] 2 Q.B. 31
(C.A.), in which a lessee breached an agreement to make certain repairs to the premises
during the lease term. The breach caused no provable loss because the landlord sold the
building to a buyer who intended to tear it down. Joyner [1891] 2 Q.B. 33 (C.A.). The court
nevertheless awarded damages measured by the cost of repairs, finding that it was "plainly
immaterial" that the landlord had been left no worse off as a result of the breach. Id.
288. Long Bldg., 74 N.Y.S.2d at 282.
289. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. b.
This symbiotic relationship between disgorgement and these equitable remedies is dis-
cussed above in Part IV (2). In the Long Building case the court did note specifically that
the landlord had not asked for an injunction. Long Bldg., 74 N.Y.S.2d at 282.
290. See supra the discussion following note 260.
291. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d
("The inadequacy of judicially determined damages is particularly evident in cases involv-
ing breach of a negative covenant, where the promisee has manifestly bargained for the
right either to set his own price for the conduct in question or to prohibit it altogether.").
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tate Co. v. Parkside Homes Ltd.,292 an influential English case. Illustra-
tion 11 to § 39 is loosely based on the facts in the case. It would allow
disgorgement of the additional profits earned by a vendee developer
from building 120 homes in violation of a covenant with the vendor to
build no more than 100. On these facts, it is fair to presume that the
vendor could have bargained front-end for a higher price in return for
allowing the vendee to build more homes. As with the no-sublet provi-
sion in Illustration 8, disgorgement of at least some of the profits earned
by the developer is necessary as a remedy of last resort to protect the
value of the covenant to the promisee.293
It is where the entitlement protected by the covenant is not pecuniary
that the promisee may be compelled to take a "disgorgement" restitution
path such as provided for by § 39. Snepp v. United States294 and Attorney
General v. Blake,295 two celebrated cases, one from the United States and
one from England, are examples enshrined by Illustration 4 to § 39.296
The cases have an uncanny factual similarity. The defendants in both
cases were agents for their respective country's secret service.2 97 Both
agents published books in violation of covenants in their contracts of em-
ployment that prohibited their publishing any information about their ca-
reers without first vetting the publications with their employers. 298 It was
uncontroverted, however, that neither of the books disclosed confidential
or classified information.299 Both books proved profitable, and each
country sued its agent to recover the profits earned from the books.300
The high courts of both countries ruled that disgorgement of the profits
was the appropriate remedy for the breaches.301
The similarity in the cases, however, ends there. The courts' theories to
support a disgorgement award differed significantly. In Snepp, a per
curiam opinion, the Court did not treat the government's claim as one for
a simple breach of contract.302 Instead, in the teeth of a vigorous dissent-
ing opinion from three justices, it concocted a fiduciary obligation run-
ning from the agent employee to the government employer. 30 3 It then
292. Wrotham Park Estate Co. v. Parkside Homes Ltd. [1974] 2 All E.R. 32 (Ch. 1973).
The case formulated what came to be known as "Wrotham Park damages," a damage mea-
surement that has subsequently been applied in English cases sounding both in contract
and in tort. Illustration 11 would allow disgorgement but change the amount awarded. The
matter is discussed below in Part VI.
293. The argument for disgorgement here is far more compelling than in a skimped
performance case like Coca-Cola, where the breach either caused no damages or caused
damages that were subsequently avoided at no additional cost to the plaintiffs.
294. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
295. Att'y Gen. v. Blake [20011 1 A.C. 268.
296. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d, il-
lus. 4.
297. Blake [2001] 1 A.C. 268 [287]; Snepp, 444 U.S. at 508-09.
298. Blake [2001] 1 A.C. 268 [277],[288]; Snepp, 444 U.S. at 508-09.
299. Blake [2001] 1 A.C. 268 [288]; Snepp, 444 U.S. at 508.
300. Blake [2001] 1 A.C. 268 [288-89]; Snepp, 444 U.S. at 514.
301. Blake [2001] 1 A.C. 268 288-89]; Snepp, 444 U.S. at 514.




imposed a constructive trust on the $60,000 Snepp received as an advance
on his book Decent Interval.30 4 The opinion, therefore, is not direct au-
thority for disgorgement as a remedy for breach of contract. 30 5 The case,
however, does suggest the necessity for such a remedy if for no reason
other than to avoid further confounding the nature of fiduciary obliga-
tion. The government clearly suffered injury from Snepp's breach, but
one that could not be quantified monetarily in a way that would support a
compensatory damage award. 30 6 Although the other dissenting justices
took a rather jaundiced view of the idea, it would seem that the United
States did have a substantial interest in reserving the right to right to
determine whether specific information could be disclosed by its
agents.30 7 If there was not some remedy for breach, little would be left
legally to discourage the agents from making self-serving determinations
when offered potentially lucrative incentives to publish their memoirs. 30 8
In contrast, Attorney General v. Blake was analyzed as a straightfor-
ward breach of contract case.30 9 The House of Lords affirmed a carefully
reasoned opinion by Lord Woolf for the Court of Appeals in which he
had trenchantly concluded:
If the court is unable to award restitutionary damages for breach of
contract, then the law of contract is seriously defective. It means that
in many situations the plaintiff is deprived of any effective remedy
for breach of contract, because of a failure to attach a value to the
plaintiff's legitimate interest in having the contract duly per-
formed... The difficult question is not whether restitutionary dam-
304. Id.
305. Professor Eisenberg takes a more optimistic view: "Moreover, although the
Court's opinion was at least nominally based on Snepp's relationship of trust, it was also
explicitly based on the Court's view that no remedy other than disgorgement would effec-
tuate the contract... In short, Snepp was at least as much a contract-law case as a fiduciary-
duty case, and really more a contract-law case than a fiduciary-duty case." Eisenberg, supra
note 103, at 589. Compare Farnsworth's interpretation of Snepp: "This generous notion of
benefits is, however, limited to actions against fiduciaries, such as agents and trustees,
whose breaches are seen as faithlessness. Had Frank's [Snepp] commitment been merely
contractual, the government could not have recovered his profits." E.A. FARNSWORTH,
CHANGING YOUR MIND, THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS 118 (1998).
306. The government did assert various types of non-pecuniary injuries. It argued, for
example, that to allow an agent to breach the covenant with impunity would cause the
United States to appear weak in the eyes of its enemies in the rough-and-tumble, cloak-
and-dagger world of international espionage. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 514. Justice Stevens and
the other dissenting justices found these assertions unpersuasive. Id. at 514-26 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
307. How far that right might legitimately extend before running afoul of the First
Amendment is an argument for another day. In his dissenting opinion Justice Stevens did
raise the point in passing. Id. at 522.
308. Similarly, in the Peevyhouse case (discussed supra in Part V. B.), the judgment
substantially undermined the value of restoration covenants in coal leases in Oklahoma
and created strong incentives for coal companies to breach them with impunity. Shortly
after the Peevyhourse decision, however, the Oklahoma legislature passed legislation that
required lessors to obtain state approval of restoration plans for potential mining leases
and to post performance bonds to guarantee that the restoration work would be per-
formed. See FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 242, at 238-39.
309. See Att'y Gen. v Blake [1998] Ch. 439 [457] (applauding the result in Snepp but
rejecting its theory of breach of a fiduciary obligation).
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ages should ever be available for breach of contract, but in what
circumstances they should be made available. 310
In granting its "restitutionary damages" award, the court was con-
cerned entirely with protecting the government's non-pecuniary contract
interest irrespective of the intent or motive of the breacher and irrespec-
tive of any special relationship between the parties.311
Illustration 10 rounds out § 39's examples of negative covenant cases.
The illustration confirms the holding in the Scottish case British Motor
Trade Ass'n v. Gilbert,312 but on a different theory. Because of the illus-
tration's nuanced complexities it is set out in full as follows:
"Attempting to stabilize the market for new automobiles at a time of
postwar shortage, members of a dealers' trade association impose re-
sale restrictions in their contracts with retail customers. (The restric-
tions in question are valid and enforceable under local law.) Dealer
sells Customer a new automobile for £5000. Customer agrees not to
resell the car within two years of purchase except to Dealer. Should
Customer wish to sell during this period, Dealer agrees to repurchase
the car from Customer at a scheduled percentage of its original price.
The price at which the car may thereafter be resold by Dealer is lim-
ited to the repurchase price paid to Customer plus a 10 percent com-
mission. One month after taking delivery of the car, Customer resells
it on the black market for £10,000. The price fixed by the contract for
repurchase of the car by Dealer is £4000; the damage to Dealer from
Customer's breach cannot exceed £400 (Dealer's lost commission
from a costless resale). Dealer may recover £6000 from Customer by
the rule in this section. '31 3
In the case itself, the court treated the Trade Association's claim as one
for expectancy damages, not disgorgement. 31 4 The court's decision fo-
cused entirely on making the Association whole for the "special circum-
stances" that necessitated the covenant.315 As was then required by the
310. Id. at 456-57.
311. It is equally correct that one who would read either Snepp or Blake as resting in
any sense on the deliberateness of the breach has misunderstood the fundamental basis of
both cases. Lord Woolf addressed the matter directly, concluding that the mere fact that
the "breach of contract is deliberate and cynical is not good ground for departing from the
normal basis on which damages are awarded" and that "the defendant's motives will nor-
mally be irrelevant." Id. at 458. The House of Lords specifically acquiesced in these obser-
vations. Att'y Gen. v. Blake [2000] 4 All E.R. 385 [388].
312. British Motor Ass'n v. Gilbert [1951] 2 All E.R. 64 (Ch.) (Eng.).
313. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d, il-
lus. 10.
314. The defendant had "not thought fit to appear" before the court, and we are not
told at what price Gilbert resold the car. Gilbert [1951] 2 All E.R. 64 (Ch.) (Eng.).The
court presumed the resale price was approximately £2200, the price at which the car had
been offered to a representative of the plaintiff shortly before it was sold to a third party.
Id. at 642-43.
315. The court estimated the car's 1951 value at the time of the breach to be £2100. No
open market was available at the time of the breach and none would be until 1953 when
governmental restrictions expired. The court arrived at the £2100 figure by taking the an-
ticipated market value of the car in 1953 and discounting it by 7.5 percent. Damages were
then calculated by deducting from that value the price for the car's repurchase as provided
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British Sale of Goods Act, the court based damages on the car's market
value. The court, however, used the inflated 1951 "black market" value to
measure the damages even though the Association could not have made
use of that market because it was obligated to resell the car at a price no
greater than the amount at which it had repurchased it. The damage
award therefore greatly exceeded the Association's actual pecuniary loss,
the resale value of the car.316 The award did, however, nicely protect the
Association's non-pecuniary contractual entitlement, which the court
identified as an interest "of the general public ... to prevent the inflation
in the value of motor cars on the market owing to the limited supply"
permitted by governmental regulations.317
The Gilbert case aptly demonstrates that the necessity for a disgorge-
ment remedy for breach of contract will vary inversely with the willing-
ness of courts to award damages for infringements of non-pecuniary
contract rights. When damages for breach are available they will apply
and trump any remedy based on disgorgement. Once the court in Gilbert
determined that the infringement had injured the Association, it turned
its attention entirely to compensating the plaintiff for the injury. 318 It
showed no concern with disgorging the defendant's profits. The court's
damage award was in fact less than the profit the court assumed the de-
fendant had made from his wrongful sale of the car.319 The case, there-
fore, supports the rule in § 39 in neither theory nor result.
Contract law traditionally has not dealt well with situations in which
the plaintiff's contract right is not readily susceptible to a plausible mone-
tary equivalent to substitute as damages.320 Intrinsic value, a common
damage measurement in tort, is largely foreign to contract remedies.
Courts often deny damages for non-pecuniary contract losses because
they regard them as speculative or because they are not provable with
reasonable certainty. Also, non-pecuniary losses do not fit neatly within
contract law's customary mathematical formulae for calculating damage
recoveries. The court in Gilbert, therefore, was aided immeasurably by
having an available "black market" against which to measure the value of
the Association's non-pecuniary contract right.321 But the absence of such
by the contract of sale. This calculation actually produced damages of £100 less than would
have a disgorgement remedy based on the price of £2200 that the court speculated the
defendant had received for the car.
316. The court was well aware of this. "The price which is obtainable [by the Associa-
tion] on the footing which I have mentioned is far beyond that which is the proper list price
of the car as delivered by the manufacturer through dealers to an ordinary purchaser." Id.
The Restatement's illustration illuminates these points by adding a provision that prohib-
ited Dealer from earning more than £400 from the repurchased car's resale. See RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d, illus. 10.
317. Gilbert [1951] 2 All E.R. 64 (Ch.) (Eng.).
318. Id.
319. See supra note 314.
320. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 352 cmt. a ("Courts have traditionally
required greater certainty in the proof of damages for breach of contract than in the proof
of damages for a tort.").
321. See Gilbert [1951] 2 All E.R. 64 (Ch.) (Eng.)
1004 [Vol. 68
Compensatory Disgorgement Alternative
a market would not have undermined the court's analysis and should not
have prevented it from awarding compensatory damages. Courts com-
monly treat individual sales as presumptive of market value. If we assume
that there was no actual black market price and that the defendant's re-
sale of the car was an isolated transaction, the price at which Gilbert
wrongfully sold the car would have served as well as the black market
price to provide a rough equivalent of the value of the Association's con-
tractual interest in preventing illicit sales. The difference between that
amount and the price the Association would have paid the defendant for
the car would then constitute its expectancy damages.
Similarly, for many infringements of non-pecuniary contract rights, the
profit the promisor receives from the infringement provides an objective
pecuniary value for what previously had been an inchoate, unquantifiable
contract right. That value should suffice in most cases as a valid starting
point for purposes of measuring the promisee's compensatory damages
resulting from the infringement. Grounds of uncertainty then should not
act to bar a recovery of damages. Contract law does not require mathe-
matical precision in calculating the amount of damages once the fact of
loss can be shown with reasonable certainty. 322 This is not to suggest that
the defendant's gain from breach will always closely approximate the
value of the plaintiff's non-pecuniary loss. 323 But it will often provide a
plausible estimate of that value and, as this article will address in the next
section, it should suffice in most cases to provide the fact-finder with a
reasonable baseline against which to estimate the amount of the plain-
tiff's loss. 324
322. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 352 cmt. a ("A party who has, by his
breach, forced the injured party to seek compensation in damages should not be allowed to
profit from his breach where it is established that a significant loss has occurred."). Where
the promisee is able to secure a finding that the breach has in fact caused a loss, the prom-
isee need only provide some reasonably certain basis for ascertaining its amount. Breach
cases in which a remedy fails on uncertainty grounds are thus uncommon. See generally
CHARLES MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 101-04 (1935) (suggesting
over 80 years ago that the only types of cases in which the courts commonly deny damages
on grounds of uncertainty are those involving lost profits from unestablished business
ventures).
323. Further, as with any other breach, not all infringements of non-pecuniary interests
cause loss. For example, the Coca Cola case, involving the wrongful substitution of artifi-
cial sweetener for sugar, and Illustration 13's example of the wrongful use of New Hamp-
shire rather than Vermont granite, represent situations where compensatory damages
would not be appropriate. These situations are discussed supra following note 268. In
neither situation did the breach cause damages because the wrongful substitution proved
to be just as beneficial to the promise as the promised performance. In these cases, any
award other than nominal damages can be left to restitution. It is only here that § 39
should be regarded as providing new ground for contract remedies, and it is only here that
a prerequisite of deliberate breach has coherence from a contract law perspective.
324. Robert Stevens takes this line of analysis several steps too far by suggesting that
damages should be awarded for the right infringed "even where this causes no loss to the
claimant and no gain to the defendant." ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS 81 (Oxford
U. Press 2007). Even conceding his point in theory, Professor Stevens's approach requires
disregard of the requirement that damages be proved with reasonable certainty and of the
core principle that compensatory damages cannot be used to improve the position that the
plaintiff would have occupied had the tort not occurred or had the contract been per-
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This type of compensation analysis has long found support in the Brit-
ish decisions, such as Gilbert, Attorney General v. Blake, and Wrotham
Park.325 In Blake, the House of Lords awarded all of the profits earned
by the defendant from the wrongful publication of his book.326 The award
was in restitution-an accounting for profits that the court curiously la-
beled "restitutionary damages. '327 In Gilbert, the award was for compen-
satory damages.328 The court's decision shows that, when the amount
awarded equals the profit illicitly earned, a compensation award becomes
indistinguishable from one for disgorgement unless the court provides
clarification in its analysis. Making the distinction in Great Britain is all
the more complicated because, unlike Restatement Third's § 39, the Brit-
ish courts allow for the illicit profits to be apportioned between the par-
ties, thereby encouraging an interesting debate among British courts and
scholars as to whether an award of partial profits such as that made in the
Wrotham Park case is compensatory or restitutionary.329 In World Wide
Fund for Nature v. World Wide Wrestling Federation, the court acknowl-
edged that under British law the choice between awarding damages or
restitution for infringements of non-pecuniary rights is largely conceptual,
but emphasized that the guiding principle for both is "the need to com-
pensate the claimant in circumstances where he cannot demonstrate iden-
formed. Id. This article goes no further than to suggest that, where a court determines that
a damage award is otherwise appropriate, the profit earned from an unjustified infringe-
ment may be used to give a non-pecuniary contract right a surrogate monetary valuation,
as a whole or in part, that will satisfy the certainty requirement for purposes of determining
compensatory damages. For the reasons previously discussed in support of a disgorgement
remedy for breach, an appropriate case for damages would at a minimum include any case
in which the right is of sufficient importance that it would have been protected by specific
performance or an injunction.
325. See British Motor Ass'n v. Gilbert [1951] 2 All E.R. 64 (Ch.)(Eng.); Att'y Gen. v.
Blake [2001] 1 A.C. 268 [285] (HL)(Eng.); Wrotham Park Estate Co. v. Parkside Homes
Ltd. [1974] 2 All E.R. 32 (Ch. 1973).
326. Blake [2001] 1 A.C. 268 [285] (HL)(Eng.).
327. Id. In his informative discussion in World Wide Fund for Nature v. World Wrestling
Federation Entertainment, Inc., [2007] EWCA (Civ) 286 [46], Lord Chadwick speculated
that the reason the House of Lords opted for a disgorgement award rather than damages
on the Wrotham Park basis was that the "concept of a notional bargain between the Crown(as employer) and a double agent [a Soviet spy] ... was, perhaps, too bizarre to contem-
plate." Indeed, Lord Nicholls for the House of Lords described Blake as a "notorious, self-
confessed traitor," who was convicted but had escaped prison and fled to Moscow. Blake,
[2001] 1 A.C. 285 (HL)(Eng.).
328. Gilbert [1951] 2 All E.R. 64 (Ch.)(Eng.).
329. Andrew Burrows has provided a thoughtful discussion of the issue. Professor Bur-
rows finds in favor of a restitution analysis because it can be used to explain all of the
relevant British cases. He concludes that a compensation analysis for many of these cases is
"plausible" but, for most, "strained." Id. Andrew Burrows, Are 'Damages on the Wrotham
Park Basis' Compensatory, Restitutionary, or Neither?, in CURRENT THEMES IN THE LAW
OF CoNRAcTr DAMAGES 165, 185 (D. Saidov & R. Cunnington eds., 2008). Conversely, far
from explaining all the cases, § 39 cannot account for many of them (those where the
breach is not deliberate) and will overcompensate in those that it does (by disgorging all
profits garnered directly from the breach). A compensatory approach, even a somewhat
strained one, should always be preferable when the alternative is to deny protection to
important non-pecuniary contract rights.
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tifiable financial loss."'330 That is precisely the principle that should guide
our American courts. 331 The punitive approach for deliberate breaches
proposed by § 39 would not undermine the incentive to award compensa-
tory damages in these cases because, by its terms, the provision does not
apply where those damages adequately protect the promisee's expecta-
tion interest. In fact, were these situations left to the provision's own de-
vices, its deliberate breach requirement would perversely require a
reversal in most of them, leaving the aggrieved party without remedy.
The Restatement's new provision is thus best regarded as just what the
commentary to § 39 espouses it to be, an exceptional remedy for egre-
gious cases of opportunistic breach, such as Blake and Snepp, where a
compensatory analysis would stretch too far but nevertheless the harsher
remedy of disgorgement is deemed necessary to protect the promisee's
contractual entitlement.
VI. MEASUREMENTS OF RECOVERY
An award that disgorges all profits from breach is likely to be justified
for most public interest cases like Gilbert, Blake, and Snepp whether the
award is intended as compensatory or as disgorgement. The promisee's
pro bono entitlement will usually be significantly more important and of
greater intrinsic value than is the principal subject matter of the contract,
like the car in Gilbert and the employment relationships in Blake and
Snepp. A threat of liability that will be appreciably less than full disgorge-
ment would not deter an opportunistic breach in these cases because the
promisor could always breach, pay damages out of the profits, and pocket
the remainder. Where the evidence suggests that the profits to be dis-
gorged will not approximate the intrinsic value that the promisee places
on the entitlement, the lack of a reasonable correlation between the
promisor's loss and the promisee's gain will prevent using compensation
as a realistic justification for disgorgement. Gilbert was exceptional in this
regard because the Association's pecuniary interest in the car was estab-
lished by the contract,332 and that value could be used for calculating
damages by juxtaposing it with the black market price at which the court
assumed the promisee sold the car.
330. World Wide Fund for Nature [2007] EWCA (Civ) 286 [59]. Lord Chadwick's deci-
sion provides a thorough analysis of the cases on both sides of the issue of whether a
Wrotham Park award represents disgorgement (an account for profits) or compensatory
damages. Id.
331. A move in this direction certainly would not be novel. Our federal patent law, 35
U.S.C. § 284, was amended in 1946 to do away with the disgorgement remedy for infringe-
ment so as to limit the claimant's recovery to actual damages. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and affd, 446
F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1971). Where the patent holder is unable to prove damages, the court
may award what it determines to be a reasonable royalty in order to prevent the infringer
from sheltering behind the uncertainty of the injury he has caused. See Panduit Corp. v.
Stahlin Bros. Fiber Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978).
332. Gilbert [1951] 2 All E.R. 64 (Ch.) (Eng.).
2015] 1007
SMU LAW REVIEW
When a reasonable correlation can be shown between the promisee's
loss and the promisor's gain, a compensation analysis will always be pref-
erable to a disgorgement approach such as that suggested by § 39. First,
unlike disgorgement, compensation for breach is a concept that courts are
accustomed to addressing. Disgorgement for breach, conversely, presents
awkward issues. It unnecessarily tasks the court with determining the mo-
tivation for the breach, a customarily irrelevant issue, and requires it to
grapple with the hoary problem of delineating the ever-shifting border-
line between innocence and opportunism. Second, as § 39's commentary
concedes, 333 the provision's disgorgement remedy leaves meritorious
claims unanswered. Third, a compensatory analysis is compatible with fa-
miliar Holmesian remedy theory - full compensation but not a cent
more-and, incidentally, with the concept of efficient breach. Disgorge-
ment ignores compensation in favor of punishment. It offers an iconoclas-
tic contract remedy-one that is disproportionate to need and foreign in
concept-to accomplish finer objectives that can be readily achieved us-
ing traditional contract remedy principles. Every reasonable effort, there-
fore, should be made to limit disgorgement's work to those cases where a
damage award cannot be rationally calculated by using all or some por-
tion of the profits at issue as a plausible pecuniary index of the value of
the promisee's contract interest. For those who would cling tenaciously to
tradition, the price of following to a limited extent tort's lead in giving
value to non-pecuniary contract interests is a comparatively small one to
pay.
Notwithstanding the incoherent example of judicial activism that we
dignify as "the economic loss rule," courts, as they must, concede that
some losses remain recoverable in both tort and contract. In such cases, it
would be absurd to say that the measurement of the particular loss varies
with the type of cause of action. Compensating for the claimant's intrinsic
value presents the identical calculus whether the wrongful infringement is
actionable in tort, in contract, or in both. To its credit, tort law regularly
protects intrinsic interests in tangible property, such as household goods,
family heirlooms, pets, and even trees, as readily as it once did for intan-
gible intellectual property. It begs no argument, certainly not an assertion
that the value of the claim is too speculative, to observe that similar in-
trinsic losses commonly result from breaches of contract. And it should
beg none that the loss in the contract action is identical to that in tort. An
excellent recent example was presented to the Supreme Court of Texas in
Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. v. Enbridge Pipelines, L.P.334 To its credit, the court
did not flinch in holding that the jury could properly award the plaintiff a
recovery for the intrinsic value of trees that were destroyed by the defen-
dant in breach of a limited easement or right-of-way agreement. 335 After
observing that the court had commonly awarded damages in tort cases for
333. Id. § 39 at cmt. d.




an owner's intrinsic value in trees where the customary damage measures
of cost of tree replacement or diminution in land value would either over-
or under-compensate, the court trenchantly concluded with the observa-
tion that: "We see no reason to compensate a party differently because
the wrongful conduct that caused the identical injury stems from breach-
ing a contract rather than committing a tort. ' 336 This observation is both
salable and practically unassailable and should apply whenever tradi-
tional contract rules leave the promisee without a reasonable remedy-
and most particularly where the breach is profitable to the promisor. And
in these situations, an argument for remedy that emphasizes compensat-
ing the injured party for the breach will always be more persuasive to a
jurist wedded to traditional remedy rules than one based on the illicit
gain of the wrongdoer.
A compensation approach for profitable breaches, however, means
that full disgorgement will not always be the correct measure of recovery.
Instead, it will allow courts to use all the customary tools of contract rem-
edy law to craft a result that is compatible with the traditional goal of
making the promisee whole without punishment of the promisor.337 A
compensatory analysis is certainly correct in the two categories of breach
that comprise the great bulk of the "disgorgement" cases that § 39 would
either usurp and duplicate or, ironically, overturn: (1) the surrogate dam-
ages cases where the defendant's profit from breach is taken as a rough
estimate of the plaintiff's lost expectation; and (2) the paid-in-advance
cases, including those of skimped performance, where the defendant has
in effect infringed upon the plaintiff's ownership of that performance. In
these cases the courts seek to award damages that will approximate the
promisee's loss. In the first category the profit substitutes for actual dam-
ages. In the second category the profit substitutes for what was in essence
a property interest that was purchased by the promisee. Appropriate ad-
justments, therefore, must be made for factors such as causation, remote-
ness, and the promisee's ability to have avoided the loss, so that the
amount disgorged from the promisor is roughly the equivalent of the loss
336. Id. at 479 (citing DeWitt Cty. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 105 (Tex.
1999) ("[T]he measure of damages for breach of an easement that restricted a right to cut
trees would be the same as the measure for negligently cutting trees.").
337. In a remedy context, punishment is a recovery that exceeds the promisee's loss.
Although punishment in this sense will often be the result of a full disgorgement, the com-
mentary to § 39 emphasizes that its purpose is to protect contract rights, not to punish
breachers. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. e.
Restitution is more concerned than is contract with the motives and intent of the wrong-
doer, but it does not oppose contract's basic principle of limiting damages to the lost expec-
tation. Indeed, in the one other situation in which these two areas of law collide, it is
restitution that supports the compensation limitation. In the losing contract scenario that
would produce negative expectancy damages, the traditional contract rule is that the recov-
ery is not limited by the expectancy interest. Restatement (Third) states the opposite rule,
limiting the recovery to the greater of the lost expectation or an allocable portion of the
contract price. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 cmt. d, with RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONTRACTS § 38(2)(b).
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to the promisee. 338 These are breach of contract cases, not restitution
ones.
339
In turn, in two categories of cases a compensation analysis cannot pro-
duce a recovery, and any monetary award for breach must be left to resti-
tution principles like those proposed by § 39: (1) in cases where the
promisee's loss cannot plausibly be estimated monetarily; and (2) in cases
where a compensation calculation results in zero damages because the
promisee's expectation has not been compromised. As noted above, the
Coca-Cola case and Illustration 13 to § 39 are examples of these no dam-
age situations.340 The promisors profitably skimped in their perform-
ances, but the substituted performances fully protected the promisees'
expectations. In Coca-Cola, the promisee lost no resale profits from using
the syrup made with the substitute sweetener, and in Illustration 13 the
granite quarried in New Hampshire was just as good as Vermont gran-
ite.341 Had those substitutions been made subsequent to the breach, rem-
edy law's mitigation of damages principle would have barred recovery in
both cases. Assume that the promisors had profitably breached in ways
that caused provable damages but that the promisees fully mitigated the
losses by, for example, purchasing at no extra cost a substitute sweetener
in the one case and substitute New Hampshire granite in the other. In
neither case would a damage recovery be allowed and, had the mitigating
substitution not been made, the unreasonable failure to do so would have
barred a recovery. In neither case would a court properly be concerned
that the promisor had profited from the breach because the promisees'
contractual entitlements had been fully protected, albeit by the promisees
themselves. Should disgorgement be awarded in either case simply be-
cause the mitigating substitute was supplied instead by the promisor
before the breach rather than after? A positive answer must come from
338. Highlighting the punitive nature of disgorgement, Restatement (Third) does pro-
vide for these kinds of adjustments for consequential damages and for restitution remedies
other than disgorgement. Restatement (Third) § 39, comment e provides that "In determin-
ing net profit the court may apply such tests of causation and remoteness, may make such
apportionments, may recognize such credits or deductions, and may assign such eviden-
tiary burdens, as reason and fairness dictate, consistent with the object of restitution as
specified in subsection (4)" of negating the wrongdoer's profit without, to the extent possi-
ble, imposing a penalty.
339. Whether the breach was willful, intentional, opportunistic, innocent, or some
shade of any of these should be no more than a secondary factor in determining the appro-
priate amount of disgorgement. In his analysis of possible measures of recovery in dis-
gorgement cases, Daniel Friedman criticizes the Restatement (Third)'s myopic view that "a
conscious wrongdoer is the sole test for ... liability to disgorge profits." Friedmann, supra
note 71, at 1888. He notes that many courts have taken a broader view. See, e.g., Frank
Music Corp. v. Metro-Golden-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1985) (allowing partial
disgorgement of profits although infringement was not "conscious and deliberate" because
defendant believed in good faith that its infringement was justified by a license that it
held).
340. The cases are discussed above in Part V.C. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-
Cola Co., 988 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1993); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. g, illus. 13.
341. Coca-Cola, 988 F.2d at 409; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. g, illus. 13.
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the law of restitution. Contract law would no longer have an interest in
the matter.
Correspondingly, in other cases it will be readily apparent that the
profits from breach greatly outweigh the value of the promisee's interest
in the breached performance. Most proponents of a disgorgement rem-
edy for breach acknowledge that taking all the promisor's profits is not
justified in these situations. A compromise amount that is commonly sug-
gested is an estimate of what the promisee would have charged and what
the promisor would have paid to terminate the contract.342 Various de-
scriptive phrases are used interchangeably to describe this amount, such
as "the buyout amount," "the release amount," "the cost of modifica-
tion," and the like.343 The concept, however, has little utility other than as
a conceptual justification for the amount estimated. The primary problem
with a "cost of modification" measurement is its impracticability. Even its
foremost American proponent, Allan Farnsworth, conceded that.344 It
would be an obvious fabrication in innocent breach cases. A righteous
breacher has no incentive to buy out of a contract when he believes he
can get out for free, and a threat of even a full disgorgement will fall on
deaf ears. And even in deliberate breach cases, deciding the buyout
amount will always require a hypothetical construction of a bargain that
did not occur. In any case in which the promisee values the performance
at issue more than the profit that will be earned by the promisor, a
buyout bargain would not be possible. In other cases, concocting a plausi-
342. See Amec Dev. v. Jury's Hotel [2001] 1 EGLR 81, 83 (describing the method as
one of determining "the sum that would have been arrived at in negotiations between the
parties had each been making reasonable use of their respective bargaining positions with-
out holding out for unreasonable amounts"). Damages, measured by what it would have
cost the promisor to buy out of the contract, were first used as a measure of compensatory
damages in Wrotham Park. Wrotham Park Estate Co. v. Parkside Homes Ltd., [1974] 2 All
E.R. 32 (Ch. 1973). "Wrotham Park damages" have been applied in both contract and tort
cases. Leading cases include Experience Hendrix LLC v. PPX Enterprises, Inc. [2003]
EWCA Civ. 323 and Jaggard v. Sawyer [1993] 1 EGLR 197. See generally Burrows, supra
note 329. Illustration 11 to § 39 is based on the Wrotham Park case but rejects its measure
of recovery in favor of full disgorgement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION &
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. e, illus. 11. In his 1985 article, Allan Farnsworth argued in
favor of limiting the amount of disgorgement to what he labeled "Gains in Terms of Saving
the Cost of Modification." Farnsworth, supra note 75, at 1387-91. He discussed the
Wrotham Park case but conceded that no American case had applied such a measurement.
Id. at 1367-68. Melvin Eisenberg rejects the "saving the cost of obtaining a release" mea-
surement as unviable. Eisenberg, supra note 103, at 566-68.
343. Although § 39 proclaims a purpose of removing breach incentives so as to en-
courage amicable renegotiation, it emphatically rejects a cost of modification measurement
for disgorgement:
The purpose of the disgorgement remedy for breach of contract is to elimi-
nate the possibility that an intentional and opportunistic breach will be more
profitable to the performing party than negotiation with the party to whom
performance is owed .... If the defendant's liability in restitution were lim-
ited to the amount that might have been paid to obtain the necessary con-
tractual modification in a voluntary transaction, there would be inadequate
incentive to bargain over the entitlement in question.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. e.
344. Farnsworth, supra note 75, at 1391 ("It can be objected that measuring the gain in
terms of saving the cost of modification would be excessively burdensome.")
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ble bargain amount will require a speculative retrospective that will typi-
cally involve consideration of extensive evidence from both sides. Breach
having already occurred, the time for arm's-length bargaining will have
long since passed. The parties' relationship will have become dramatically
different. Their exculpatory evidence at trial will have been presented in
the context of a litigation death match, and the arbiter will have
prejudiced a balanced perspective by having decided the issue of guilt
before turning to the question of estimating the recovery.345 The presen-
tation of the core position of both parties ultimately will have been bor-
ing and repetitive-that she, not he, was the superior bargainer, and that
she, not he, would have negotiated the far greater share of the profit pie.
It is thus disingenuous to seriously maintain that this sort of disharmony
could have helpfully guided the fact-finder in making a fair approxima-
tion of what would have been the result had the parties actually engaged
in arm's-length bargaining.346
The unworkability of the "cost of modification" approach is demon-
strated by the very case that first applied the concept, Wrotham Park Es-
tate Co. Ltd. v. Parkside Homes Ltd.347 The defendant had breached a
restrictive covenant that prohibited development of certain land without
the owner's approval. 348 The owner conceded that it had incurred no pe-
cuniary loss because the value of the land had not been diminished by the
345. In his article on the guesswork involved in establishing damages based on a rea-
sonable royalty in patent infringement cases, David Taylor correctly observed: "Indeed,
while the hypothetical negotiation construct contemplates the patent owner and the in-
fringer negotiating over the value of patent rights, the assumption of liability purposefully
increases the damage award above what an actual negotiation over patent rights would
contemplate." David Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49
GA. L. REv. 79, 158 (2014). Professor Taylor argues that this liability component is neces-
sary to avoid what he calls "double discounting"; i.e., to balance an assumption of discounts
that the parties probably would have negotiated when liability was uncertain. Id. In re-
jecting the hypothetically negotiated royalty approach in favor of basing reasonable royal-
ties on the basis of the patented technology, he also argues that: "The assessment of
compensatory damages implements a liability rule; any assessment of damages occurs after
a determination of liability for infringement. Determining reasonable royalties under the
hypothetical negotiation construct, however, applies a property rule-like analysis, despite
the fact that a person has unilaterally destroyed [the right to enforce the patent]." Id. at
155; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in
Patent Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH L.J. 725 (2011). See
generally id. at 143-50.
346. Melvin Eisenberg is absolutely right to conclude that "the amount that a promisee
would have required to give a release is not only unknown but in most cases unknowable."
Eisenberg, supra note 103, at 568. On the other hand, unless his reference is to surrogate
damages and paid-in-advance cases, he is wrong when he maintains later is his article that
apportionment should not apply in most disgorgement for breach cases. Id. at 600. He says:
"In general, there should be a heavy thumb on the scale against apportionment because
usually apportionment would either undercut disgorgement or be otherwise inappropri-
ate." Id. By definition, apportionment will always undercut disgorgement. But it is not
inappropriate to apportion disgorgement when the purpose is to accommodate contract
law's primary goal of allowing a fair measure of recovery to the plaintiff without punishing
the defendant.
347. Wrotham Park Estate Co. Ltd. v. Parkside Homes Ltd. [1974] 2 All E.R. 32
(Ch.)(Eng.).
348. As noted previously, although Illustration 11 to § 39 is based on the facts in
Wrotham Park, it rejects the court's measure of recovery in favor of full disgorgement.
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breach.349 The court thought that the owner should nevertheless be
granted some remedy, but that a full disgorgement of profits would be
excessive. 350 It ultimately settled on measuring damages based upon the
price that would hypothetically have been agreed to by the parties had
they engaged ex ante in a release bargain. 351 The court then concluded
(somehow) that the appropriate resulting price would have been £2,500,
which represented 5% of the profit that the defendant conceded it had
earned.352 Most extraordinarily, however, the court had prefaced its anal-
ysis by candidly admitting that the hypothetical bargain it was concocting
was a pure fabrication. Its award did not in any way represent what might
actually have occurred had the parties attempted to negotiate a release
because: "On the facts of this particular case the plaintiffs, rightly con-
scious of their obligations towards existing residents would clearly not
have granted any relaxation but for present purposes I must assume they
could have been induced to do so.''353
Assuming nothing is lost in the translation to the American version of
our common language, what Judge Brightman surely must have meant by
this seemingly nonsensical observation was that he regretted that the par-
ties had not negotiated a "relaxation" price, because he was now left with
the unhappy task of picking a price out of thin air. If this is correct, then
in cases where full disgorgement is deemed unfair, the high-sounding -ac-
tivity that has been subsequently described as determining "the cost of a
hypothetical bargain" or "the cost of modification," or some such thing
will usually be nothing more than coming up with a reasonable price
349. Wrotham Park [1974] 2 All E.R. 32 (Ch.)(Eng.),
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. As authority for this approach, the court relied heavily on tortious invasion of
property interest cases, particularly those of intellectual property. Compare id., with 35
U.S.C. § 284 (providing that damages for patent infringement shall be "adequate to com-
pensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use
made of the invention by the infringer ..."). A leading case is Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and affd, 446
F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1971) (when market rates or other objective criteria are not available,
court may award reasonable royalty based on hypothetical arms-length negotiation that
might have occurred between the patent holder and the infringer immediately prior to the
infringement). For an informative recent study of calculating reasonable royalties in patent
infringement cases, see Taylor, supra note 345. To date, our courts have shown little incli-
nation to extend these kinds of hypotheses beyond the infringement cases.
353. Wrotham Park [1974] 2 All E.R. 32 [815] (Ch.)(Eng.). Indeed, the "covenantee"
could not lawfully demand money for release of the covenant, which was for the benefit of
the residents abutting the property at issue. Id. at 808. The justification for this sort of
obfuscation, of course, is that it is a preferable alternative to that of leaving the promisee
without remedy. As Judge Hand famously observed about the similar fiction of determin-
ing a reasonable negotiated royalty as a remedy in patent infringement cases: "The whole
notion of a reasonable royalty is a device in aid of justice, by which that which is really
incalculable shall be approximated, rather than that the patentee, who has suffered an
indubitable wrong, shall be dismissed with empty hands." Cincinnati Car Co. v. N.Y. Rapid
Transit Corp., 66 F.2d 592, 595 (2d Cir. 1933). And as Professor Taylor notes: "One of the
primary benefits of the hypothetical negotiation construct is that it provides an easy way
for a jury to conceptualize the legal question the court is asking it to decide." Taylor, supra
note 345, at 122.
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based on all the facts and circumstances. 354 In this country's legal system,
that sort of activity is familiar courtroom humdrum. Juries do it every day
in tort actions all across the country as they place monetary valuations on
pain and suffering, on arms and legs, on eyes and ears, and on all sorts of
things that have no conceivable pecuniary value.355 Juries can even tell
plaintiffs their future employment prospects, what kind of raises they will
earn over their careers, how long those careers will last and, ultimately
and unconscionably, when they will die.
Juries, in short, are uncannily good at resolving mysteries, even those
with few clues. For them to decide how most breach profits would be
apportioned should hardly be fantastic. Indeed, compared to unraveling
the esoterica customarily encountered in evaluating personal injury
awards, assessing the intrinsic value of contract rights should be compara-
tively simple, particularly when a relevant objective index of that value
(the breacher's illicit profit) is readily at hand. For example, the jury ver-
dict in the now rather infamous case Peevyhouse356 could have been an
exemplar for compensating the Peevyhouses for their non-pecuniary in-
terest in their home. To reprise, the facts at trial showed that the dis-
gorgement pie was approximately $29,000, the savings of the promisor in
failing to perform the restoration covenant.357 The actual damages were a
comparative pittance of $300 based on an objective market value, a sum
most certainly inadequate to protect the intrinsic value of the property to
the Peevyhouses.358 The farm in its restored state would have been worth
$5,000 at most.359 On appeal, the court had before it three possible dam-
age awards: (1) the $5,000 jury verdict; (2) the $29,000 cost of restoration;
and (3) the $300 diminution in the value of the land.360 The court's ulti-
354. A quarter of a century after Wrotham Park, in Blake, Lord Nichols defined the
award more elegantly as simply a reasonable amount that the promisor should pay in re-
turn for the benefit he received from his violation of the promisee's contractual
entitlement:
The Wrotham Park case, therefore, still shines, rather as a solitary beacon,
showing that in contract as well as tort damages are not always narrowly
confined to recoupment of financial loss. In a suitable case damages for
breach of contract may be measured by the benefit gained by the wrongdoer
from the breach. The defendant must make a reasonable payment in respect
of the benefit he has gained.
Att'y Gen. v. Blake [2001] 1 A.C. 268 [283-84] (HL)(Eng.).
355. Robert Stevens responds to those who find such an approach to be arbitrary and
unworkable by drawing a comparison to measuring damages for personal injuries, where
the law uses a "tariff system based upon the degree of seriousness of the infringement of
the right." ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS 79 (Oxford U. Press 2007). He recog-
nizes that this approach is "less easy" outside the context of personal injuries but suggests
that courts should have "no choice but to set guidelines" for awarding damages for non-
pecuniary losses. Id. It appears implicit in Professor Stevens's analysis that the valuation
would depend, not only on the degree of infringement, but upon the importance of the
right to the plaintiff.
356. The Peevyhouse case is discussed above in Part V.B.
357. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 111 (Okla. 1962).





mate choice of $300 has very few fans, and properly so. 361 If the court had
instead simply affirmed the jury award, Peevyhouse probably would have
assumed its rightful place in law lore as an innocuous little case with a
decision that was, for the time, perhaps a little strange.
To illustrate, let us assume that the trial judge had instructed the jury
that it could award damages measured by the cost of restoration only if it
found that the plaintiffs would use the money to restore the land.362 Dur-
ing deliberations the jury quickly and unanimously rejected the notion.363
361. It has become exceedingly unfashionable, even heretical, in contract law circles to
suggest that the case was correctly decided. The drama here is attributable to the fact that,
thanks to the remarkable scholarship of Judith Maute, the plight of Willie and Lucille
Peevyhouse has become rather personalized in law school classrooms for almost a half
century now. See Maute, supra note 233. We think fondly of Willie and Lucille, and most of
us wish they had gotten a better shake. Regardless, if the $5,000 jury award were taken off
the table, the Peevyhouse case probably would not come out any differently today than it
did in the 1960s. To simplify a bit, the debate over whether the court got it right must
ultimately rest on whether one believes that the Peevyhouses would have invested $29,000
into fixing their property, an amount that represented more than six times the value the
property in a repaired condition. Today that would be a most difficult proposition to sell to
any jury, just as it was a half century ago. As the court said in an English equivalent of
Peevyhouse in denying recovery for the cost of tearing out and rebuilding a swimming
pool: "[the promisee's] stated intention of rebuilding the pool would not persist for long
after the litigation had been concluded." Ruxley Elecs. & Constr. Ltd. v. Forsyth, [1995] 3
W.L.R. 118 (H.L. 1995). Melvin Eisenberg's conclusion about the case reflects a popular
view: "Peevyhouse was incorrectly decided, because the court considered only the objec-
tive market value of the farm, not the subjective value of the farm to the Peevyhouses."
Eisenberg, supra note 103, at 595. Every word of Professor Eisenberg's statement is true,
but only because the court overturned the $5,000 jury award, not because it failed to allow
recovery of the full restoration costs. He is also right that: "Unless the court is convinced
that the promisee would not [use the damage recovery to restore the property], damages
should be measured in the normal way, that is, by the cost of completion." Id. As Profes-
sors Thel and Siegelman succinctly explained: "The diminution in market value will not
fully compensate a promisee who places idiosyncratic value on the completed project.
However, the award of the cost of correction will overcompensate the idiosyncratic value if
the promisee values performance more than the market does but not as much as the cost of
correction." Thel & Siegelman, supra note 115, at 1526 n.28. Clearly, there is ample room
between these two extremes for a middle ground that would grant an apportionment of the
promisor's gain to compensate for the promisee's idiosyncratic value.
362. In the case itself, the trial court left the determination of the amount of damages
largely to the jury's discretion, allowing the jury to consider the cost of restoration in addi-
tion to "all of the evidence offered on behalf of either party." Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 111.
A good jury issue, accompanied by an appropriate instruction, should not be difficult to
formulate. For example, assume that the net profit subject to disgorgement is $1,000,000.
The issue might be framed as follows: "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, in compensation
for the defendant's breach of his contract with plaintiff, of the amount of $1,000,000 earned
by defendant from his breach, what percentage or amount in dollars and cents do you find
that plaintiff should receive, taking into account the relative bargaining positions of the
parties at the time of the breach and all of the evidence that you have heard in favor of the
plaintiff, including [list illustrative factors such as those pertaining to the value of the enti-
tlement intrinsically to the plaintiff, the unavailability of any comparable substitute per-
formance, and the willfulness of the defendant's breach] and all of the evidence that you
have heard in favor of the defendant, including [list illustrative factors, such as those per-
taining to the innocence or good faith of the defendant's breach, the degree to which the
profits are the product of defendant's own energy and initiative, the remoteness of the
profits as they relate to the plaintiff's contractual entitlement, and the likelihood that plain-
tiff could have found some comparable substitute for defendant's performance]."
363. Despite plaintiffs' professed love for their land, the jury surely noted that the
plaintiffs had not asked for the remedy of specific performance to require that the defen-
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But it then directed its attention to the $29,000 that the mining company
had pocketed in leaving the Peevyhouses with a mess of a farm. Discus-
sion followed, culminating in a decision that, given the benefit inuring to
the mining company as a result of its breach, justice required that the
company should pay the Peevyhouses an amount that would compensate
them for their intrinsic loss attributable to the disfigurement that the min-
ing company had left behind.364 Had the Oklahoma court then affirmed
the $5,000 jury verdict as a compensatory award for that loss, the court's
decision might well be regarded today as a wise resolution to a vexing
question, and one clearly preferable to the $300 and $29,000 alterna-
tives.365 When there is such great disparity in results from applying two
dant restore the land. They also may have had doubts that one who really loves his land so
much would allow it to be strip-mined in the first place.
364. Allowing for consideration of subjective value in awarding damages is not com-
pletely foreign to contract law. For example, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 348(2)
suggests a damages rule for breaches of construction contracts that allows flexibility to
consider the subjective value that plaintiffs place in their property. For cases involving
defective or unfinished construction where "the loss in value to the injured party is not
proven with sufficient certainty" the promisee may recover damages based on either dimi-
nution in value or cost of repair, so long as the repair costs are not unreasonably dispropor-
tionate to the 'probable loss in value to him."' Id. (emphasis added); see, e.g., Mathis v.
Glover, 714 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. App. 1986) (affirming damages for the cost of tearing out and
replacing major work in a home because, in contrast to commercial property, a home "has
aesthetic value and must be constructed as the owner wants it, even though the finished
dwelling may be just as good[ ]"). The Restatement of Torts has a similar rule for injuries to
property. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 cmt. b (1979) (cost of repairs that
are disproportionate to diminution in value not recoverable "unless there is a reason per-
sonal to the owner for restoring the original condition").
365. Contract law does acknowledge intrinsic value as an appropriate consideration in
awarding expectation damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 347(a) provid-
ing that "the injured party has a right to damages based on his expectation interest as
measured by the loss in the value to him of the other party's performance..." (emphasis
added). The Restatement also provides for consideration of intrinsic value in allowing for
expectancy damages greater than the injured party's objectively quantifiable loss. See id.
§ 348 (allowing for recovery of expectancy damages measured by repair or restoration
costs "if that cost is not clearly disproportionate to the probable loss in value to him[ ]"
(emphasis added)). Awards based on intrinsic value will always be arguable. In the water-
shed Wrotham Park case, for example, the court allowed the estate that represented the
interest of a number of homeowners a recovery of only 5% of the £50,000 earned by a
developer who had intentionally breached a restrictive covenant in the belief that its legal-
ity was questionable. Wrotham Park Estate Co. Ltd. v. Parkside Homes Ltd. [1974] 2 All
E.R. 32 [816] (Ch.)(Eng.). The court may have been influenced by the fact that the plain-
tiffs did not pursue an interlocutory injunction to protect their interest but instead allowed
construction to proceed while the litigation progressed. Id. at 810. In this country we have a
smattering of comparable decisions, mostly infringement cases. Lawrence Friedmann
nicely juxtaposed two illustrative American cases that demonstrate disparate awards that
can result: Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939), affd, 309
U.S. 390 (1940), and Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505 (9th
Cir. 1985). In Sheldon the court apportioned the defendant's profits to award plaintiff only
20% of the almost $600,000 earned from a movie that had "deliberately" plagiarized sub-
stantial portions of plaintiff's play. 106, F.2d at 55. Friedmann suggests that the apportion-
ment may have been overly kind to the defendant. Friedmann, supra note 71, at 1889. On
the other hand, he says that the court in Frank Music may well have gone too far in favor
of the plaintiff both in the disgorgement percentage it awarded for the primary profits
earned from the illicit use of plaintiff's music in a hotel's stage production and also in
awarding a percentage of secondary profits attributable to the production's drawing cus-
tomers for the hotel's rooms and gaming tables. Id. at 1889-90.
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customarily available damage formulae and both results are clearly inac-
curate estimates of the claimant's indisputable loss, our remedy regime is
seriously flawed if it cannot allow the flexibility to make a more rational
approximation of that loss. Choices of giving all or allowing nothing will
in many cases understandably represent ridiculous alternatives, particu-
larly where an estimate or apportionment of amount is clearly the better
choice. And more often than not, to be approximately right is far better
than to be absolutely wrong. In such cases, conceding imprecision in re-
sult is always a bargain price for averting manifest injustice.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is little support in the case law either in this country or in Great
Britain for a disgorgement remedy for breach of contract similar to the
one proposed by the new Restatement of Restitution. Few of the cases that
§ 39 uses to justify its criteria actually supports them. To account for this
misdirection, the provision loosely interprets some of the cases, changes
the result in others, and adopts a different theory to support the result in
still others.
As some of our strongest academic writers have taught us over the past
half-century, there are plenty of cases scattered here and there over time
that have disgorged profits from breach to protect contract interests that
otherwise would have had no adequate remedy. The courts in most of
these cases, however, focused their attention on the plight of the prom-
isee. They demonstrated only consequential concern with the profits gar-
nered from breach by the promisor. In the surrogate damages cases, the
profits served as a measurement of the promisee's loss. Disgorgement
was incidental to compensating the promisee. In the paid-in-advance
cases, the profits were the end result of tracing a contract interest that the
promisee had previously purchased-a property-oriented analysis. Again,
the disgorgement was incidental.
Restatement (Third) § 39 is a remedy for breach of contract glaringly
clothed in restitution finery. By attempting to function while so re-
strained, it appears as bumbling to the mannered nature of contract rem-
edy law as would a blue-collar worker going about his business in top hat,
tie, and tails. As a contract remedy, it is placed as the final section of
Chapter 4 of the new Restatement along with other contract-based restitu-
tion remedies. It should therefore relate with these remedies and behave
accordingly. But it does not. As a sin-based, punishment-oriented, all-or-
nothing remedy, it has little in common with any previously known rem-
edy for breach, whether compensatory or restitutionary. Its kin are the
other raucous disgorgement remedies, which are gathered immediately
following § 39 in Chapter 5. A remedy that results in an award that ex-
ceeds a plaintiff's loss for the sole purpose of coercing conduct (here, a
negotiated settlement agreement) is penal by any definition and, as such,
is repugnant to contract law. By confining its availability to cases of delib-
erate breach-another concept that contract law prefers to ignore-§ 39
2015] 1017
SMU LAW REVIEW
offers only minimal coverage of the compensation remedy gap. All the
worse, the provision's refusal to allow for an apportionment of profits
ignores basic contract remedy tenets pertaining to causation, remoteness,
and avoidability of loss. 366
This is not to say that § 39 does not have its place. It aspires to be a
remedy for only rare cases where an adequate remedy is not otherwise
available. These should be only those where disgorgement in whole or in
part cannot reasonably be said to be compensatory in nature and, solely
for this reason, a remedy to protect the contractual entitlement must be
left to the muddier playing field of restitution. Farnsworth correctly iden-
tified "abuse of contract" breaches as the only ones that call for a dis-
gorgement remedy such as that proposed by § 39. His primary examples
were skimped performance cases and cases where the promisee's contract
interest cannot be protected because of time's passage. A compensation
approach cannot do the work in these situations. In both types of cases,
the breach causes no loss to the promisee other than an unquantifiable
loss of entitlement. In the skimped performance situation, the cheaper
performance benefits the promisor while satisfying the promisee's expec-
tancy interest. The Coca Cola case discussed above is a good example. 367
In the time's passage situation, the promisor profits but again causes no
damages, and the time for performance has passed. The breach of the
sublease prohibition covenant discussed above is a good example. 368 In
both categories of Farnsworth's abuse of contract, however, had the
breach been caught in time the promisor would have been able to use the
promised performance to obtain a reasonable substitute. But Farnsworth,
contrary to § 39, would have allowed disgorgement in these cases regard-
less of the nature of the breach.
The true gap in contract's remedy structure is not for the lack of a
disgorgement remedy, but because contract's remedy rules historically
have not compensated for non-pecuniary losses. A sensible adjustment in
the rules to allow for a compensation-based approach would be a much
366. As noted previously, Restatement (Third) specifically provides for apportionment
in applying restitution remedies other than disgorgement. See supra note 331. Section
51(5)(d) also states certainty rules similar to those for damage awards. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(5)(d). Once the plaintiff has pro-
vided evidence "permitting at least a reasonable approximation of the amount of the
wrongful gain," any "residual risk of uncertainty in calculating net profit is assigned to the
defendant." Id. Illustration 14 to § 51 is one of several examples provided to demonstrate
how apportionment should work in these cases. Id. § 51 cmt. g, illlus. 14. The illustration
involves a copyright infringement by defendant (Studio) in producing a movie titled "Letty
Lyton." Making a proper apportionment of the profits directly attributable to the infringe-
ment is difficult. Ultimately, however: "Evidence presented at trial would support a range
of answers between twenty-five percent of the total (according to Author's expert) and nil(according to Studio's expert). Weighing all the relevant evidence, the court concludes that
the proportion of Studio's profits attributable to the infringement is somewhere between
zero and 10 percent; moreover, that the correct answer within these limits is impossible to
determine. Because the risk of uncertainty in such an accounting is assigned to the wrong-
doer, Author is entitled to 10 percent of the net profits ... 
367. See the discussion following note 247.
368. See the discussion following note 287.
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preferable alternative to the punishment-based, full disgorgement rem-
edy that is proffered by the new Restatement of Restitution. The compen-
sation problem in non-pecuniary loss cases has never been one of proving
causation, but rather with contract law's less rigid certainty principle. The
breach has caused an obvious loss either by infringing on a promisee's
contractual entitlement or by depriving her of it altogether, but courts
typically have had at hand no pecuniary index against which to value the
promisee's loss. When, however, the promisee profits directly from his
violation of a contractual entitlement, that profit provides the needed pe-
cuniary index against which to measure the promisee's loss much like our
courts have long done for infringements of intellectual property. Great
Britain's Wrotham Park approach unshackles contract law to this extent
and points in the right direction for protecting the promisee's expectancy
interest. Unfortunately, Wrotham Park provides a hobbled and contro-
versial means for getting there. An apportionment of profits is the appro-
priate remedy, up to full disgorgement in extreme cases. But allowing
juries to make the apportionment based upon the relevant facts and cir-
cumstances is a far preferable alternative to the British concoction of a
hypothetical buyout price.
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